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CHAPTER I

INTRO DUCTION
Relations between Mexico and

"W1'~

United States were
/

quite satisfactory during the major part of the Diaz regime.
Porfirio Diaz was in pOVler from 1876 until 1910.

He had been

elected on a platfo~l advocating non-~eelection, so in 1880
/

his friend, General Gonzalez, "('las placed in office and ruled
/

for a term, after which Diaz returned to the presidency and
there remained for twenty-six years.

His chief objective

waS to make Mexico a prosperous nation.
industrial and commercial profits.

He aimed to increase

In follovdng this program

he sVTept aside what, to him, were irrelevant matters.

He

ignored social, spiritual and cultural problems of which there
was an abundance.

The industrialization and comm,ercial expatf-

sion of the nation he effected; but it waS of little benefit
to the masses.

" followed the principle of expediency, that tithe end
Diaz
justifies the means."

He accomplished many things 'which

'were beneficial to the nation. l
Mexico.

Peace waS established in

But peace was not wi thout its price.

Opposition

1 For a brief statement of these see W. S. Robertson, History
of the Latin American Nations, D. Appleton, New York, 1943,

7;65-466.

1

2

newspapers vrere suppressed.

One of his policies for '!3tifling

opposi tion "was that of playing his supporters off against one
another before they could develope suffic'ient strength to
oppose him. n2 Material prosperity waS greatly increased.
1893, n1az appointed

In

Jos~Ives Limt~tour, a French creole,

Secretary of the Treasury.

Most of the financial reforms
/

which were initiated under the niaz'Iegime can be credited to
Limantour.

The latter e'stablished the monetary system on a

gold basis.

He also abolished the hated alcabala, a sales tax

inherited from Spanish times.

Another of his accomplishments

was consolidation of the railway system. 3
telegraph lines were greatly expanded.

Railroads and

In 1876 there had

been 691 kilometers of railroad; by 1911 there were 24,717
kilometers. 4 Imports and exports were increased. They were
valued at 51,760,000 pesos in 1873; by 1910 it was 87,916,000
pesos.5

The national income was increased from $19,776,638

to nearly $100,000,000 by the end of the niaz regime~6

""

In

/

order to achieve this commercial expansion, Diaz pavmed his
country~s
-~---

resources to foreign capitalists.

.....--6

2 Herbert Ingram Priestley, The Mexican Nation, ! Histo:ry"
Macmillan Company, New YorK,""1923, 380.
3 Ibid., 383.
4
391.
~ I'OI<I., 391.
o Erne'st Gruening, Mexico ~ Its Heritage,
Century Company,
New Yorlt, 1928, 561 ..

ma.;

3
In 1884 he

sponsor~d

a mining code which decreed·that the

surface proprietor ?ms entitled to subsoil rights.

Foreign

investors eagerly seized this opportunity to exploit Mexico 1 s
vast mineral resources.

Unfortunately this process tended to
,. "7

increase the concentration of land into the hands of a few and
to increase the material poverty of the larger part of the
people.

Any discontent on their par\ vmS smothered by the

capable hands of the local officials and police.
Foreigners benefited greatly under the administration of
I

Diaz.

Not only were they offered lucrative economic oppor-

tunity, but they vrere given security, protection and precedence in local dealings.

Americans were not the only ones to

benefit by these favors; but the bulk of the investors were
Americans.

"Nor were the concessions generally such as would

yield returns without expense, effort or ingenuity.,,7

1913
......

By

about 75,000 Americans were living in Mexico as miners,
engineers, merchants and agriculturalists.

American invest-

ments totaled about $1,500,000,000 -- a sum larger than that
other foreigners combined. 8

Americans oWned

78%

0

of the mines,

72% of the smelters, 58% of the oil, and 68% of the rubber-

.'
7 J. Fred Rippy, The United states and Mexico, Alfred A.
8 Knopf', New York-;-I926, 311, 312. . .
House Doc. No. 305,' 57 Congo 2 sess., I, 5030 Fall
CommIttee Report II, 3322.

.

business of Mexico. 9

American
investments
in mining vrere
.
.

valued at $95,000,000, investments in agriculture at
$28,000,000 and in manufacturing at $10,000,000. 10

The total
investments of Mexicans were valued at $792,187,242. 11
Foreigners looked upon Diaz

vr.t~K

approval.

Elihu Root,

Theodore Roosevelt t s Secretary of State had said:

"I look on

I

Porfirio Diaz, the President of Mexicf' as one of the great
men to hold up for the ·worship of mankind. n12
I

However, after the turn of the century, Diaz began to
meet

,'n. th

increasing criticism in Mexico.

/

Diaz could stop

this but he could not stop the encroachment of age.

It waS

not the masses, so long pressed down, that began to foment the
opposi tion but the landed educated Mexicans vlho felt that they
were being

tr

sold out" to foreign interests.

Various organs

of the press conducted anti-Yankee campaigns.
Correo de Espanol, ~ Nacionai,
El Debate,

!1

!! Tiempo,

These included

~ Patria,

I

Pais, and El Diario del Hogar. 1 3

I

Diaz soon

clamped a censorship on these papers. 14
President Taft, 1909,

v~ote

to his Wife:

---------r
9 Ibid., 3322.
10 James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexico,
Macmillan Company, New York, 1932, 511.
-11 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 1st sess., 2232.
12 Robert Bacon and James Scott, Latin America and the United
13 States, Harvard Press, Cambridge, Mass., 19l~lOS:
Rippy, 323.
14 Ibid., 324 • .

-

5
It is inevitable, that in case
.'
of a revdlution or internecine strife,
we should interfere and I s.,incerely
hope that the old man's [Dia~ official life will extend beyond mine,
for that trouble vrould present a 15
problem of the utmost difficulty.
It waS during the Taft years that
foreign outlets.

A1ne7rican

capital was seeking

Dollar diplomacy was in vogue.

vided an outlet for surplus capital
American manufacturers.

af

Mexico pro-

v.rell as a market for

Taft's fears of a revolution vrere to

be jus tified t'lNO years later.
I

In March, 1908, Diaz in an interview 'with J'ames Creelman
of Pearson's Magazine, stated:
••• he vvould welcome the formation of a political party which
should put forward an opposition
candidate; that he v~uld surrender
the power to such a candidate if
legally elected. l 6
.
This announcement precipitated a storm of political activity''''''
in the form of opposition parties.

In the fall of 1908, a

pamphlet entitled The Presidential Succession of 1910 waS
published by Francisco I. Madero.

It embodied a political

reform program, one point of which stressed no reelections
I

for the presidency.

The author, Madero, 'was a member of the

privileged classes.

His family ovmed large tracts of land and

.'

.

15 Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft,
1

6 Farrar and Rinehart,New-yorlc," 1939, II, 700.
Priestley, 396.

-

6
held vast mining and banking
interests.
.

As his book eecame

increasingly popular, he was hailed as the leader of the
opposition.
The follovdng April, 1909, Madero and Francisco v~squez
G6mez were nominated for' president'·aRd vice-president by the
anti-reelectionist party.

The anti-reelectionist party planned

to restore the Constitution, grant frfedom of the press, create
elective suffrage and stimulate education.

As the time for

elections drew near, "the old Chief had let it be lmown that
he would again respond to pressure and go through the form of
another election in spite of the Creelman interview."l?

I

Diaz

suppressed the party meetings and on July 6, 1910, Madero was
jailed on the charge of plotting a rebellion.
On October 4, 1910, the government declared Diaz reelecte
But it waS clear to many that age had caused him to lose his
grip on public affairs. 18 Three days later, Madero, by this
time free on bail, jumped his bond, disguised himself as a
workman, and crossed the border into the United states.

He

declared the recent elections null and void and began revoluI

tionary pJ.ans.

He issued his plan of San Luis potosi,19

restating his program and announcing his provisional presi-,
17 V~lfrid Callcott; Liberalism In Mexico 1857-1929, stanford
18 University Press, 1931, 171. ----- ---Robertson, 467.
19 Priestley, 398.

7
dency.
V~en

He set November 20th as the date for the rebel1ion.

he recrossed the border, only a small band of armed men

joined him; since this was insufficient he returned to San
Antonio.

A few days later, Francisc? Villa, a Mexican bandit
.• "7

defeated state troops in Chihuahua.
leader of the Madero revolution.

Villa declared himself a

Madero reentered Mexico,

joined the ".A:rmy of the North" and

t~

revolution gained

momentum.

"
On the 9th of May, 1911, Ciudad Juarez
was taken and this
marked an important victory.

Eniliano Zapata, the leader of

the peons in the south, took Morelos.

Federal troops met
I

everyvlhere with increasing resistance.

May 21, Diaz Signed a

treaty in which he agreed to resign.20

On May 25 his resigna-

tion was given.

Francisco de La Barra, foreign minister, be-

came interim President.
taining some Maderistas.

His cabinet was a coalition one,

con~

"",

He vms pledged to hold elections.

In October, elections were held and Madero was elected
President.

Taft immediately recognized his government.

Mexico vras in need of many reforms, political, economic, and
social.

The many malcontents,

,~o

had supported Madero,

expected him to carry out their various programs.
ever, was not primarily a man of action.
20 lli..£., 401.

Madero', how-

Priestley states,

8

"The executive authority for which he was
unadapted was destroying to his nerves. n21

temperament~lly

He waS unable to

please the diverse groups which supported him.
VIas full of criticism.

The atmosphere

The newspapers urged rebellion. 22
,;P

"7

Military leaders conspired against the government:
The successes of the revolution had aroused all the military
ambition put under an.anaesthetic
by the vigor of Dfaz. NO"l, however,
all wanted vnth share of the spoils. 2 3
Revolutionists in the south were discontented because no
immediate land restoration was made.

Madero had promised the

peasants land and this he 'waS not able to deliver.

It "would

take time to create a land commission and more time for the
commission to ,rork out an acceptable plan. 24 Madero had also
stressed the need of improving educational facilities; but
there were few teachers to be found.

The foreign element was

,."

discontented because it was no longer granted concessions with
/

the free hand that characterized the Diaz regime.

The
I

cientificos and wealthy classes who had benefited by Diaz
favori tism were discontent.
mercena~

istration~

reasons vrere disappointed at his idealistic adminExtreme reformers felt that Madero was being" too

21 Ibid.; 405.
22
408.

mer.,

Many who had joined Madero for

23 ~cott, 201.
24 Francis Clement Kelley, Blood-Drenched Altars, ~ce
Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1935, 217.

9
/

.

They y,rishecl him tcf" adrrrin-

conciliatory to Dartisc..:ns of Diaz.
"-

ister

t

justice t to the supporters of D(az. 25

s;ctisfy no one.
aS

TI

All he had

\'!~S

ECldero could

a sound theory of goverrr::lent,

judged by the constitution, ·,'lhicb., as

"\72.S

plain, 1,Iexico ','ms

not yet re,:dy to use.!l26
LIadero vms not a tyrnnt; he nttem.:9tecl to give the peo})le
e)OI:locratic rule. 27

ifhis me.do it e2,si;r for the opposition to

organize \."i thout inte:d'erence.

1111e ne\'Ispa:9 ers, 8i ven freedom

fro:cl censorship, Tlrococo.cd to ['..ttack r.Int1ero. 28 As a result,
LIadero attempted to introduce

Q

bill to the Chanber of

Deputies '."Thich ',iDuld curtail freedom of the :9ress.
furor

tIaS

SUch a

aroHsecl. that tile bill '(las 1.';i thdraUll. ')9
(-

In --'GlIe south, the agr3.rlCl,l1S of Zayata, inpatient for
land reforms, too:: action for themselves.
Orozco, I'rho had been one of Madero

t

S

In the north,

military leaders in the

rev'olution, led 3. rebellion for la11 110";::nors.

I~e

accused
/

l1c'..c1oro of failing to CD.rry out the I)lr'n of San Luis Potosi .3 0
I'riestley nentions that :fLeG.o.ers of the rnvoJ_ution such as
Orozco felt snubbed in the w:ltter of 8.p)ointNents ."31LIexico
needed

Y.1al}y

refor:ns but Lie.dero ilad not the strength of

2'"'"J Ro bert son , 1~67.
2b Kelley, 219.

27
28
29
30
31

Callcott, 2011--.
Gruening, 95.
Callcott, 202.
Ibid., 206.
Priestley, 406.

10
character necessary to impose
these reforms.
.

Rebellicm.s in

both the north and the south continued to harass the amninistration. 32
On February 9, 1913, General Bernardo Reyes attempted a
coup d t etat which '!vas thwarted by· etu~tavo Mad.ero, brother of
the President, and Reyes met his death.

tTTen bloody days

followed; the capital city 'waS

by revolutionists;

bomba~ded

thousands of innocent people were slaughtered in the streets."3
NoV! the leadership of the rebellious forces fell to Felix
I

Diaz, nephew of the former dictator.

~Vhile

/

the Diaz forces

sVlelled, General Victoriano Huerta was placed in charge of the
palace guard.

I

This was done by Garcia Pena, Minister·of War,

"rather against the vn.sh of Madero who had no great confidence
in the man. n34 Huerta, on the morning of the eleventh, made
~

a pact vn. th Felix Diaz and arranged. for the overthrow of the
.~

Madero government. 35

They informed the United states Ambassa-

dor, Henry Lane Wilson, of their intentions.
ten bloody days of revolution.
wired the state Department:
some

acti~m

Then came the

February 17, 1913, Wilson

"Huerta notifies me to expect

that will remove Madero from povtTer at any

32 Ibid., 407.
33 ~nt 4690
34 Priestley, 411.
35 ~., 1,,12.

11

.'

moment. n36

, The follmving day', February 18, Huerta seized the
government.

During the day, Gustavo Madero was arrested and
~

killed; in the evening, Huerta and. Felix
Diaz met at the
,
),. "7

American embassy and drew up plans for the government to be
headed by Huerta.

Ambassador Wilson vJired Washington advising

President Taft to recognize the Huer\a government.

The Taft

government was somewhat wary of the Ambassador's part in the
proceedings as is evidenced by the message sent from Secretary
of State Knox to Henry Lane Wilson on February 20, "General
Huerta's consulting you as to the treatment of Madero, tends
to give you a certain responsibility in the matter."37
Madero's removal waS hardly distasteful to Ambassador Wilson
and the foreign capitalists residing in Mexico.

The civil

strife and ensuing results had been a matter of great concer~
to the entire Diplomatic Corps.3 8 Madero's inability to control rebellious movements, some of which were anti-lmleric an ,
prevented,him from granting the security and protection the
foreigners had previously enjoyed. 39

Furthermore, industrial

---------,
36 Papers· Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United'
states, GOvernment Printing Office, Washington;
1913,
8120. (Hereafter this work ¥all be referred to as ForeiSA
Relations.)
3~ Ibid., 1913, 8121.
59 l?+,Ie,st1ey, 414~
!lli:.., 407.

n.C.,

12
operations were

hampered by the civil

serious~y

which were taking place.

disor~rs

United States capital had employed

1,800,000 Mexicans in 1910.

In 1913, 500,000 Mexicans

formerly hired by United states capital were unemployed. 40
,

.

"Of the 40,000 Alllericans, ••• discro~ed as permanent residents,
possibly 20,000 were in Mexico at the beginning of March,
1913."41

The foreign colony looked tf Huerta to reestablish

order.
Madero's place was taken by a very different type of man.
Huerta waS decisive, a

m~n

of action.

different from that of Madero.

His background was very

Huerta was born of Aztec

parentage at Colotl~, Ja1isco in 1854.42

He was discovered in

his native tovm by a General who needed someone for secretarial
vrork.

I

Huerta came to the attention of Diaz and through his

influence e'ntered the National Military School from which he .;rib
graduated in 1891.

At one time he headed the Geodetic SUrvey

and at another time was Inspector of the National Railvreys.43
He was made a Brigadier General in 1896.

His decisive victory

over the Orozco forces, who rebelled agai'nst Madero, vron him
military

~cclaim.

He was a Porfirista and knew no other than

....
40 Callcott, 220.
41 Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico, MCBride, Nast
42 and Company, NewTork, 1913, 340.
-Ro bertson, 470 •
.. . . .
..
...
43 Edith OfShaunessy, A DiE10matts Wife in Mexico, Harper and
Brothers, New York,-191 ,122. ------

13
porfirian methods in su~pressing all opposi tion. 44 H<1i.'lever,
he was to meet with his strongest opposition in a man beyond
his realm, beyond his power of suppression.

This man was

Woodrow Wilson.
,• •Y

The situation was well described by Edvfard Bell, who was
in Mexico at the time:
TvJO strong and refourcei'ul
men had taken the higHest seats
in two countries -- strong in
different ways, contrasted rather
than similar in acumen, vrldely unlike in experience, and as far
apart as possible in their
morality. 45
Thomas Woodrow Wilson was a scholarly, unmilitaristic
man.

Idealistic theories rather than hard realities governed

his actions.

He was born, the son of a minister, at Staunton,

Virginia in 1856.

He studied and practioed law but soon gave

it up to become a professor of history at Bryn Mawr.
Wilson became President of Princeton University.
elected Governor of New Jersey in 1910.

In 1902"',

He was

In 1913 he became

President of the United States.
His waS the first Democratic administration in 16 years.
#

...

It was up to him, an amateur in politics, to interpret the
foreign policy of the party to the world at large.

His slight

experience in politics had been confined to domestic and local

44 Bel::j., 211.

45

~.,

338.

14

issues.

He 'was a man

'~th

fixed ideas and, as 'will be' shown

later, refused to avail himself of the opinions of authorities.
Only three of the ten men in his cabinet were experienced
in the vJOrk they were to perform.

William Jennings Bryan was

·

made Secretary of State as a gestu~e~to the large faction of
the party vlhich he controlled.

According to the historian,

John Spencer Bassett:
The Secretary of State was
very weak in international law
and he never showed that he grasped
the foreign situation; but he brought
the president a powerful political
support at a time when it was needed. 46
Henry Stoddard, the Washington journalist, "vrites:
It is a mercy to Bryan to
say little of his career as
Secretary of State.
That Wilson tolerated him
so long is the best tribute I
know to Wilson's self-control and
patience. Of course, Bryan in
the cabinet was politics, but
even politics has its limits. 47
Bryan was decidedly no asset to Wilson in conducting foreign
affairs.

But Bryan waS not responsible for the foreign

policy of the Wilson administration.

R~y

Stannard Baker,

I

friend and biographer of the president, states that:

46 John Spencer Bassett, A Short History of the United States,
Macmillan Company, NeviYork, 1938, 854':'g5,.
47 Henry L. Stoddard, As I Knew Them, Presidents and Politics
from Grant ~ Coolinge; Harper-and BrOthers, ~ork,
~, 284.

I

15
••• it was difficult for him
(Wilson] to delegate authority,
especially in matters vvhich profoundly engaged his interest or
aVlakened his emotions; and he
suffered in foreign affairs
especiallY by the weakness of
those upon whom a Pr.esident should
have depended 1.'71. th c"onfidence.
The devotion, the loyalty and the
ideals of Bryan were beyond doubt;
but the fact remained that Wilson
never allovred any thread of the
complicated Mexican si~uation to
escape his Ovvn attention.48

.'

Evidently the Mexican policy of the Vtllson administration
was directly that of Woodrow Wilson himself.

His attempt to

force democratic principles on Mexicots government was to
change the course of Mexican politics for many years.

48 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters,
Doubleday, Doran and Company, New yo~lm, IV, 344.

.'
CHAPTER II
THE PRO BLJ!M

OF RECOGNITION

The United states, shortly

af~.eJ:
.9

.7

its establishment,

instituted a policy of recognition distinct from that
practiced by Europe.

This policy, novel though it was, be-

came increasingly important.
"Recognition is the assurance given to a new state that
it \rlll be permitted to hold its place and rank in the character of an independent political organism in the society of
nations. ttl

It is therefore of prime importance to a new

government that it be accorded recognition.

Should a state

fail to be recognized, it 1rould have great difficulty maintaining a position among the nations of the

v~rld.

Recogni-

tion itself devolves on nations other than the state con-

~

cerned and as such is subject to their attitudes and
practices.
European nations in the eighteenth century recognized
goverIllllents on a

.9:2. jure basis. Only goverIllllents which were

I

established on the basis of legal succession Viere recognized.
Revolutionary goverIllllents were denied recognition in favor of

1 Rivierts definition quoted by John Bassett Moore, Digest of

International Law, Govt. Printing Office, Wash.D.C., 1906-;I, 72.
-

16

-

17
legal claiments.

This r-de jure policy . was consistent With

monarchical principles underlying European governments.
According to monarchical theory, legal authority proceeds
from the cro'wn and is transmitted by succession.

.

Thus revo-

lutionary governments 'would have n'5 ·:;'uthori ty.
The government of the United States was founded on an
entirely different set of principles.
upon the consent of the governed.
from the people.

The government rests

Legal authority proceeds

The recognition policy of the United States

is consistent with these principles.

Governments which rep-

resent the "vill of the people possess legal authority and
therefore are entitled to recognition.
George Washington, the first president of the United
states, expressed his attitude as follows:
••••My politics are plain and simple.
I think every nation has the Right
to establish that form of government under which it conceives. It
shall live most happy, provided it
infracts no right or is not dangerous to others. And that no
governments ought to interfere va th
the internal concerns of Another,
except for the sec~ri ty of what is
due to themselves.
The French Republic, in 1792, gave the United States its'
first opportunity to express its foreign policy in regard to

2 Letter to Marquis de Lafayette, Dec e 25, 1798.

18

recognition.

Thomas

Je~ferson

instructed Grouveneur Morris,

our minister to France:
It accords v~th our principles
to acknowledge any government to
be rightfUl, which is formed by the
"nIl of the nationi~stantially
declared. 3
Again, in a letter to Morris, 'Jefferson Ivrote:
We surely cannot deny to any
nation that right whe/eon our
government is founded, that everyone may govern i,tself according to
whatever form it pleases, and change
these forms at its ovm vdll ••• The
'will of the nation is the only
essential thing to be regarded. 4
Jefferson

follo~~d

the logical assumption that this

gover~~ent

being established by revolution, it was rightfUl for the
United states to acknowledge other govermnents so formed by
the vdll of the people.
So the de facto policy of recognition

VlaS

inaugurated. ""

A government t s right to existence and recognition

'\'TaS

predicated on the fact that it existed and represented the
popular will.

Once the nation had committed itself to the use

of the de facto policy, this policy VIas put into frequent
practice.

~

The republican governments of South America were
....
recognized as one by one they shook off the Spanish yoke.

3 Paul Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Putnam, ,.
~~w York, 1"S95", VI, 131.Ibid., 143.

4
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This vmS at first in

th~

Central European powers.

face of strong disapproval

f~bm

the

They continued, in Europe, to follow

the de jure policy and discouraged the formation of new
governments, by putting dovvn insurrections in Spain (1823),
Naples (1820), Piedmont (1821).
Our attitude is clearly stated in a letter from Van Buren,
then Secretary of State, to Mr.

Moor~

minister to Colombia:

Your business is solely concerned with the actual government
of the country where you are to
reside, and you should sedulously
endeavor, by a frank and courteous
deportment to conciliate its esteem
and secure its confidence. So far
as we are concerned, that which is
thegov~~nm~nt de facto is equally
so ~ jure.
The policy vms further amplified by Euchanan in 1848:
In its intercourse vdth foreign
nations, the government of the United
states, has, from its origin, alvmys
recogn~zed de facto governments.
We
recognize tEe right of all nations
to create and re-form their political
institutions according to their own
will and pleasure. We do not go behind the existing government to
involve ourselves in the question
of legitimacy. It is sufficient
to know that a government exists
capable of maintaining itself; and
then its recognition on our part
inevitably follows. o

"'..

5 Moore, I, 137.
6 Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to Mr. Rush, March 31,1848
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Eventually, the European
powers began to see po sst.
bilities in the

~

facto policy.

In 1861, Britain recognized

the belligerency of the Confederate government.

William

Seward, Secretary of State, was disconcerted by this use of
our recognition policy:
Revolutions in Republican
States ought not to be accepted
until the people have .~dopted them
by organic law with th! solemnities
which v~uld seem sufficient to
guarantee t~em stability and
permanency.
Had Se"ward t s interpretation been applied to cases
involving recognition of Latin Amerioan Governments, our
policy would have been greatly altered.
effect though, in a few instances.

It did have its

The United States refused

recogni tion to the governruent of Maximilian in Mexico, on the
grounds that the government did not represent the vnll of the
people and that it violated the Monroe Doctrine.

.Another

break in the traditional policy occured in 1885 in regard to
Nicaragua which had just been vitimized by William Walker and
his associates.

Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, ''!rote to Mr.

VJheeler:
It appears that a band of
foreign adventurers has invaded
tha t happy country ••• and now

7 Sen. Ex. Doc. 53, 30 Cong., 1 sessa

..

"

Diplomatic Correspondenc
of theUni ted States Relating to the Foreign Office, 1"Nashington, D.C., 1866, 630.
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pretends to be in possession of
the sovereign authority. The knowledge ¥re have of the proceedings
does not authorize the President
to recognize it as the de facto
government of Nicaragua:-and he
cannot hold, or permit to hold, in
your official charact~~, any political intercourse wi tli the persons now
claiming to exercise thegsovereign
authority of that State.

.'

Unfortunately, Mr. Vfuee1er had a1readl implied recognition and
waS compelled to retract that implication.
The various Mexican governments, from the monarchy of
Iturbide through the Republican administrations up to the
time of Maximilian, had been recognized by the United States.
A$

has been mentioned, Maximilian's administration was not

recognized.

The fo1lo,rlng Presidents, Julrez and Lerdo de
I

Tejada, had been recognized.
Chief Executive.

The United

In 1876, Porfirio Diaz became
States~

under the

admini~tration

of President Hayes, denied him recognition for t,ro years,
until April, 1878, because of turbulent border conditions. 9
The United states recognition policy fell under a shadow
v,hen the hastily organized Republic of Panama waS recognized
by

Theodo~e

Roosevelt in 1904.

The fact that the United State

immediately signed a treaty with the newly proclaimed republic

8 M:r. Marcy to Mr. Wheeler, United states Minister to
Nicaragua, November 8,1885. House Q2£. 103,34 Cong.1
9 Rippy, 298.

sess~35
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indicated its approval if not its cOBplicity in the e&tablishment of the state. lO

This incident brought about distrust of

the Yankee Colossus.
In February, 1904, the Hague Tribunal handed dO'wn a
decision regarding the collection ol~foreign debts from
Venezuela 'which had defaulted.

It set dovlD. the principle

that a nation had the right to use fOIce to collect debts from
another nation.

As the Latin American nations frequently de-

faul ted on their financial

0

bligations the Vlestern hemisphere

could expect European intervention in the future.

Rather than

let this happen, for such an event vrould violate the spirit of
the :Monroe Doctrine, the United states resolved to intervene
itself and see that such debts were paid .11
famous Roosevelt corollary.

This

i'laS

the

nleodore Roosevelt, in a message

to the Senate, February 15, 1905, said that if an aggrieved
nation undertook to collect its debts it '\'JOuld be necessary
to effect a blockade, a bombardment, or seize the customs
houses of the defaulting nQtion.

This vrould actually be

temporary possession of the latter nation.
The United States then becomes
a party in interest, because under
the Monroe Doctrine, it cannot see

10 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United
States, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Hevl York,1:'90, 151.
11 Ibid., 152.
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any European pO'wer seize and permanently o~cupy the territory of one
of these republics; and yet such
seizure of territory, disguised or
undisguised, may eventually offer
the only way in which the power in
question can collect any debts, unless there is interi'.e-rence Qn the
part of the United ~ates.12

.'

Thus intervention in case of financial emergency was made part
of United

Sta~es

Latin American foreifn policy.

In 1907 eight Peace Conventions between the Central
American Republics were signed at Washington.

These were

drawn up under the good offices of the United states and
Mexico.

Though neither of these parties signed the agreements

they were morally bound, because of their sponsorship, to live
up to the principles set forth. 13 One of these principles was
an agreement not to recognize revolutionary governments until
they became legalized by free elections.

This vrould consti~

tute a restraining influence on the United states recognition
policy.
That the above principle was not adhered to may be seen
in the following incident which occurred'during the administra
tion of President Taft who succeeded Theodore Roosevelt. .In
1909 President Zelaya of Nicaragua attempted to cancel
United states mining concession.

12 Foreign Relations, 1905, 334.
13 :semis, 161.

Shortly aftervlards a

a~...
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rebellion against Presi4ent Zelaya broke out.

It

had~he

sympathy of the said United states mining concession,14
Zelaya's army captured tvro citizens of the United states who
held commissions in the revolutionary
. army.
,

martialed and executed.

They were court-

.• 4'7

President Taft sent the marines to

Nicaragua to protect American interests there.
overthrown and the succeeding
the United states.

gove~nt

Zelaya waS

was recognized by

Taft's intervention vms not calculated to

inspire trust in the Latin American policy of the United
states nor undue respect for its recognition party.
Recognition of a foreign power is a prerogative of the
executive branch of the government.

The Constitution of the

United states does not explicitly mention this power.

It is

inferred from the following statements in the Constitution
relating to the powers of the President: " ••• he shall receive
.......
ambassadors and other public ministers H15 and " ••• he shall
nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ••• ,,16

If the President does not appoint representatives

to a foreign government nor receive ambassadors from that
governmen~

it is not recognized according to international

law. I?

14 Ibid., 162.
15 ~Constitution of the United States, Article I, section 3
16
d., Article II;-section 2.

1?
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From the foregoing, it can be seen that the de faeto

.

recognition policy suffered from time to

t~e

according to

the interpretation of the men who were charged with executing
the policy.

Recognition depended on two things; existence of

.

the government and acceptance of it·o~ the people.

Prior to

the Civil War, little attention was paid to the origin or
nature of new governments.

After the. Civil War, a little more

caution was employed vuth regard to recognizing governments of
unsavory origins and undesirable natures.

Hovrever, political

facts and not morality dictated the policy.
century, Europe too, followed the

~

By

the twentieth

facto policy, especially

in regard to the turbulent South American republics.
The

~

facto policy was to undergo further changes under

the administration of President Woodrow Wilson.

He waS in-

,

tensely serious in his assumption of official responsibilities.
He believed public morality as important as private morality.""'"
AS a public servant, he intended to raise the level of public
morality.

He believed that morality should govern interna-

tional principles.

Several years earlier', in his book,

~

state, he )lad iNri tten of international law:
It is simply the body of rules,
developed out of the common moral
judgements of the race which ought
to govern nationsSin their dealings
'Vn th each other. ~

.' .

IS Vbodrow Wilson, The State, Heath and CompanY,Boston, lS99,

629.
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The Huerta government of. Mexico presented President Wi4J..son
vri th an early opportunity to put his theory into practice.
Victoriano Huerta assUIlled power in Mexico on February 18,
1913, following the overthrow of the constitutional govern-

.

ment of Francisco I. Madero.
Wilson, the United states

Three· £ays later, Henry Lane

.~bassador

to Mexico, urged the

government at Washington to grant iInm.:diate recognition to the
neVI government.
General Huerta,

On February 23, Madero, then in custody of
"laS

shot.

President Taft declined to take any

action 'which might possibly prove embarassing to his successor.
Philander Knox, Secretary of State, 'vvrote to President-elect
"Vilson:
Any formal act of recognition is to
be avoided just at present. In the
meantime, this government is considering the question in the light of the
usual tests applied to such cases,
important among which is the question
of degree to which the population
assents to the new regime and the
question of disposition and ability
to protect foreigners and their
interests and to respond t~ all
international obligations. 9
It is probable that the Taft aruninistration felt that Huerta
6

VJOuld be recognized eventually.

This is true especially in

view of the fact that the American colony in Mexico City
seemed to approve of him.

At the moment, it

19 Foreign Relations, 1913, 748.

,\-vaS

better to let

r
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things rest until the s<?andal of !vIadero t S death had

d~d

dovm.

Woodrow Wilson asst.1l11ed the presidency in March, 1913.
His VIaS the first Democratic administration since that of
20
Clevelana.
He sounded the keynote of his forei~l policy in
a statement given out a fevl days aft;r his inauguration.
One of the chief objects of
my administration v:ill be to cuI tivate the friendship ~d deserve the
confidence of our sis-e"er republics
of Central and South America •••
We hold ••• that just government rests always upon the consent
of the governed, and that there can
be no freedom without order based
upon law and upon the public conscience
and approval ••• We shall lend our
influence of every kind to the
realizAtion of these principles in
fact and practice ••• We can have no
sympathy with those who seek to
seize the povrer of government to
advance their ovm personal interests
or ambition •••
The United States has nothing
to seek in Central or South America
except the lasting intere$ts of the
peoples of the t~;\lO continents, the
security of governments intended
for the people and for no special
group or interest, and the development of personal and trade relationships between the two continents
which shall redound to the profit
and advantage of both and interfere with the rights and liberties
of neither.
.' .
From these principles may be
read 80 much of the future policy
of this government ••• 21

20 See page 1).
21 Foreign Relations, 1913, 7.

•
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This message presaged

m~ny

of dollar diplomacy.

It indicated that the United states

things.

It sounded the dedth knell

would oppose any Latin American government which did not represent the will of the people.

ThQ mention of those who
,. 47

"seize the pOVler of government to advance their ovm personal
interests" seemed to be a veiled indictment of Huerta.
The Huerta issue was pressing to. be settled.
Wilson, the Ambassador appointed by the previous

Henry Lane
a~~inistra

tion and representative of Republican policies, sent dispatches urging recognition.

He prepared a statement advising

recognition which would embody the folloiving terms:

that

international questions such as those regarding the Chamazel
and the Colorado River be settled; that an international
claims commission be appointed to deal inth affairs caused by
the revolution; that there be a guarantee that presidential
elections be held; that order and peace be restored to the

"'"

26th parallel; and finally that .American troops be allowed to
cross the 26th parallel to establish order. 22
.Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson further supported his
requests

~or

recognition of the Huerta government on the basis

of its legality.

Huerta's government was legal.

Madero and Vice· President Su;rez had resigned.

Presi~ent

Pedro

22 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 2 sess., Sen. Doc. 6975.
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Lascurain, the Minister ,of Foreign Affairs, then succeeded
to the presidency as provided for

u~der

the constitution.

He

assumed office, appointed General Huerta Minister of the
Interior and then resigned.

Thus Huerta, as far as the

.
..
Mexicans vrore concerned, succeeded to the presidency in a
.

,;,

constitutional manner.
President Wilson, hovrover, vms ufimpressed by" \'That he
considered Huerta's technical pretentions to legality.
referred to Huerta as a usurper:

f~surpations

He

like that of

General Huerta menace the peace and development of America as
nothing else could. n23

According to the peace Conv"entions of

1907, by vlhich the United States was morally bound, revolutionary governments were not to be recognized until they were
legalized by free elections.

Josephus Daniels, Wilson's

Secretary of the Navy, stated:
Wilson and Bryan had come to
the firm conviction that it v~uld
be viTOng from every consideration
to recognize the usurper. They
vrore confident that the masses of
l1exicans were opposed to him.24
Wilson disapproved of Huerta's method of obtaining pO"Vler and
I

held him responsible for Madero's death.

Priestley states:

In spite of all his [Huerta's]
protestations, it is recognized

23 Forei~ Relations, 1914, 443.
24 J'ose}! us Daniels, Wilson~, Chapel Hill, University of
North Carolina Press, 1944, 182.
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that the moral responsibility
for the ~ccurence rested upon
him. It formed the basis of
the determination of the Democratic administration of the
united2~tates not to recognize
him •••

.,'

.

On the other hand, Colonel House, t.h8 President 1 s advisor,
Huntington Wilson, the Assistant Secretary of State, in charge
of Latin American Affairs, and John Bassett Moore, Counselor
...
for the State Department, urged de facto recognition. 26
The European nations, after waiting vainly for a sign
from Washington, took the initiative themselves.

Great

Britain recognized Huerta's government vdth an autographed
letter from the king.
Minister to Mexico.

Sir Lionel Carden "vas named British
Recognition followed by S];>ain, China,

Italy, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Norway, Russia, Japan and
,

most of the Latin American countries.

Sir Lionel Carden rep-

resented an active British colony in Mexico City.

The lion

of this colony was Lord Cowdray, the oil magnate. 27 He and
his associates ardently supported the Huerta administration. 28
still the United States refused to grant its approval to
the Mexicitn government.

The Vlorld 'tImi ted for action on the

--------25
26
27
28

Priestley, 418.
Bemis, 175. Daniels, 180.
Bell, 344.
Ibid., 348.

~
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part of the Wilson

admi~istration

but none waS forthcdfuing.

President Wilson waS exercizing his belief that international
principles should be based on morality and he considered the
Huerta government deeply immoral. 29 Wilson defended his stand

.

,;P ,;,

on the grounds that the Huerta government was not constitutional; that it did not represent the vdshes of the people.
In an address to Congress, August 27,.1913, he said:
The territory in some sort
controlled by the provisional
authorities at Mexico City has
grOVID smaller, not larger. The
prospect of the pacification of
the country, even by arms, has
seemed to grow more and more
remote; and its pacification by
the authorities at the capital
is evidently impossible by any
other means than force.30
Ray Baker vvri tes that 'rNilson decided that Huerta must be
removed:
No real peace, or order, or
stability was possible so long as
the control rested in the hands
of a tyrant who was in no way
responsible to the people and
against whom a large portion of
the people were in actual'rebellion.3l
#

That Huerta did not control the country, he felt, was

.'

.

evidenced by the presence of rebel leaders such as Villa and
29 Harley-Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policl of ~odrow
Wilson, Johns HopkinsPress:-Ebston,'1937, 228. -30 Address to Joint Session of Congress, August 27, 1913.
31 Baker, rv--; 263.
--
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Carranza in the northern, part of the country and

Zapat~

in the

south.
The issue between Wilson and Huerta took on a personal
aspect.

Baker, Wilson's confidant, said:

.

V'Jhile Vlilson fo'tght on
principles -- his conviction of
the ultimate rightness of his
cause added immeasurably to his
power -- it is also trlje that
some of his greatest struggles
tended to become personal
encounters ••• ln the present
struggle it was Huerta. Huerta
must go.3 2
Pancho Villa had become prominent '\'lhen he took Chihuahua
in support of Madero t s revolution in 1911.
joined forces.
against Huerta.

NOi'T

He and Madero had

he and Venustiano Carranza joined forces

Carranza had been governor of Coahuila.

/

During the Diaz regllle he had regularly received money from
the federal treasury to maintain local troops.

By use of a"'''

device knov,?- as the padded arr:lY list, "Thereby non-existent
men are placed on the paYJ."o11 , Carranza netted a tidy little
sum.

'When IvIadero came into pOiver he discontinued these pay-

ments.

At the time of Huerta t s assluuption of povler, Carranza
#

agreed to recoenize Huerta if the army payments \'lOuld be
resumed.

When Huerta did not make these payments, Carranza

seized 50,000 pesos from the State Banks.

32 Ibid., 311.

Huerta demanded an
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explanation, though the banks were not under his
and Carranza revolted. 33
the Constitutionalists.

juri~iction,

The Carranza forces called themselves
~le

leader of the agrarian movement

~

in the south VIas a peon, Emiliano Zapata •

.

President Wilson held a firm c1pYnion vii th regard to
revol,utions.

He believed that, IlRevolution Vias only' righteous

,.

when it waS necessary to establish liberty and self-government,
it had no place in a democracy; it was deeply vvrong "'hen it
,,'las resorted to against constitutional government." 34 Evidently Wilson did not see anytbing v;Tong with Carranza f s
rebellion against Huerta whom the Mexicans considered their
President.
people.

Wilson seemed to apply his definition to selected

He believed that Madero'S revolution had been
/

necessary to overthrow the tyranny of Diaz and to establish
self-government for the people .35

He believed that :Madero

had established self-government and that Huerta's seizure of"""
the government vras unjust.

It was unjustified because it

overthreVI the constitutional government.

He felt that

Madero's revolution was justifiable and therefore morally
right;

th~

Huerta revolution vras unjustifiable and therefore

morally "'.Tong.

33 Kelley, 227-229.
34 Notter, 228.
35 Ibid., 228.

"'.

34
Wilson believed

tha~

governments purporting to be·'

democratic should choose their executives by elections. 36 He
apparently did not understand that an election, in the North
American sense

o~

the term, was almost impossible in Mexico •

.

.• 4Y

The people were not educated to a democratic
ment.

~orm o~

govern-

No democratic elections had ever taken place.

Samuel

Flagg Bemis, authority on diplomatic

r~lations,

states:

In many Latin American countries,
not to mention the rest of the v~rld,
governments have been republican
only in form and letter. Once ensconced
in constitutional authority, a government, that is to say a strong man,
by control of electoral machinery,
the police and the army, can extend
his povrer under color of the constitution. Tb deny the right of revolution against such a regime v~uld be
to frustrate real self-government. 37
The usual method of ascending to the presidency was by revolution.

President Wilson was judging Latin American politics by

Anglo-American standards.
Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson was greatly disturbed by
the attitude of the administration.
Republican appointee.

The ambassador VIas a

He was experienced in Latin .American

#

politics and could see no resemblance between the policy of
the administration and the practical aspects of the case.
He later '\vrote:

36 Bemis, 173.
37 Ibid., 173.

."

35
It is not an easy matter to
interpret or define the attitude
or policy of the Wilson administration toward Mexico ••• That policy
transmitted into effect meant simply
that no government established in
Mexico by a revolution vrould be
recognized by the ~e+ican government if, according ~o~our OVID estimate, the revolution were unjustified ••• the dictum amounted to a
su~ersi~n of the sovereignity of

.'

Mex~co.j

.Am.bassador Wilson's attitude 'was shared by many others who
felt that the policy of vnthholding recognition could be of no
pos~ible

benefit to either Mexico or the United states,

especially
as the other povrers had already granted recogni" .
tion.39
President Wilson believed that the British government in
granting recognition had been influenced by cownercial
interests.

,

This suspicion was based on the fact that Sir
",.

Lionel Carden, the British Ambassador, was connected with oil
interests which had Mexican concessions.

Vfilson waS

deteroined to terminate ftdollar diplomacy.,,40

Ray Baker

explains Wilson's attitude:
vVhat Wilson saw ••• when the
unexpected foreign problems confronted him, was that the same

.'

38 Henry Lane Vfilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Ivlexico, Belgium
and Chile, Doubleday,~age and COmpany,~ew York,1927,304.
39 l3eiiiis, 174.
40 Bell, 137.

r
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.'

forces were arrayed against him
in the foreign field as at home.
The very same men, He had attacked
in his campaign the 'interlocking
directorates' of powerful bankers
and capitalists which controlled
the trusts, the railroads, public
uti Ii ties. He had q,n4.y to s cratch
the surface of the ~i~uation in
Mexico and China to discover the
same force at vrork. 4l

Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson represen.ted the very faction that
Wilson hated.

The Ambassador was knovvn to be an advocate of

"dollar diplomacy."

He had been appointed by William Ho'ward

Taft, vmo practiced the theory of "dollar diplomacy."

The

duty of the Ambassador was to protect American interests in
Mexico.

Henry Lane Wilson felt that a strong ruler in Mexico

was better than none at all.

Order was necessary to protect

American nationals and investments.

Henry Lane Wilson's
,

brother, former Senator John Wilson, was intimate with
Ballinger; who was a close friend of the Guggenheims. 42
Guggenheims had commercial interests in Mexico. 43
Ambassador

1vaS

Huert~

The

known to be a spokesman for the commercial

interests in Mexico.
the

The

government.

He continually urged the recognition of
He had, on at least one occasion,

urged Madero to resign and had championed Huerta's assum1'tion'
of power. 44

Rippy states that:

41 Baker, IV, 60.
1/2. Bell, 137.

43 Gruening, 561.
44 Priestley, 412.

r
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.,.

Wilson pressed his demands
for claims upon a bankrupt government, urged Madero to resign and
apparently sought to terrorize him,
by th~ menace of armed intervention. 4 5

I

He felt that an orderly government,WQuld
better protect United
,.,. 4,
states interests and investments.
The non-recognition policy of the United States had the
effect of retarding economic

transac~ons

in Mexico.

The

government itself 'was in need of a loan, which other nations
refused to grant, pending the uncertainty of United States
recognition.

Such a loan waS necessary to finance army action

against the insurgents in the north of the

count~J.

Likevrlse,

industry was suffering from lack of fresh foreign invesi4nents.
Advocates of recognition accused the United states of
deliberately contributing to economic har.dship in Mexico.

The

President's supporters countered vdth the reply that if

,~

Huerta's government was as strong as purported to be and if it
really represented the will of the people it would not be of
prime importance whether it was recognized or not.
David Houston, a member of Wilson's cabinet, vrrote:
There was much uproar among
certain elements of the United States
over this policy of watchful wai ting. There vrere many who were anxious

45 Rippy, 345.
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to see Huerta recognized. They
thought that if he vrare supported
he might sustain himself, re~tore6
order, and become a second D~az.4

.'

'While .American cormnercial interests might welcome a "second
Dfaz, ff such a regime could hardly so.lve
the problems of the
,;;. ....,
Mexicans.
Early in May, 1913, Jonas Spreyer, a New York banker,
called on the State Department regardlng a $10,000,000 loan to
Mexico which was to mature in June.

Mr. Spreyer feared that

vdthout United states recognition, Huerta

v~uld

be unable to

borrow the money to repay the loans; that serious trouble
might result, the Huerta government might collapse and the
United states v~uld have to intervene. 47
Also in May, the President received a communication representing American business interests

in~exico.

Some of
,~

these interests were Phelps, Dodge and Company (mining),
Greene Cananea Copper Company, the Southern Pacific Rail,rc1Y,
and the .American Petroleum Company.48

These interests

suggested that the United States recognize Huerta in return
for which Huerta would agree to hold a fair election sooner
than octo~er, the time Huerta had set for the next elections •
This

v~uld

ensure stability.

..

Huerta was already de facto

46 David F. Houston, Ei~t Years with Wilson's Cabinet,
Doubleday, Page and ompany, New York, 1926, I, 79.
47 Baker, 349.
48 Baker, IV, 253.

.
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authority and as such ,vas capable of carrying out the.agree.ent • This would put an end to the civil war which was
destroying the country. The communication also stated that
()ther nations 'were undermining the influence of. the United
,

.

states in Mexico while it 'r.Lthheld'~Ycognition.49
Wilson toyed

~le,
~e

~th

For a

the idea of assenting to this plan.

went so far as to draw up a recomm:ndation embodying its

teatures, but for some reason never submitted it to his
cabinet. 50
The question of Madero'S death was also discussed at
Huerta disclaimed all responsibility for
]Madero'S death. 5l However, most of the American public felt
~eat

length.

"that he was implicated by the facts.5 2 Madero was shot while
in custody of Huerta; and Huerta stood to profit most by
,

JMadero's death.

Huerta issued a statement explaining the

incident:
•• ~aderoand Pino Su~rez •••
were taken to the penitentiary •••
When the automobiles had traversed
about two-thirds of the way to the
penitentiary, they were attacked
by an armed group and the e seo rt
descended from the machines to
offer resistance.
Suddenly the group grew

.,,---------1+9
6:0
~
~~
"/

Ibid

IV' 246
i'E'fCT., IV;, 247.•
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P'riestley, 417.
~.,

318.
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larger and the prisoners tried
to escape'. .An exchange of shots
then took place in which one of
the attacking party was killed,
tyro vrere vlOuuded and both prisoners
were killed • .?3

.'

.AIIlbassador Wilson accepted Huerta t B.. ~~rsion of the tragedy. 54
He pointed to a case of bloodshed in which Madero had been

involved.
The American .Ambassador, and the+Bri tish, Spanish, and

German Ministers urged Madero to resign when they learned that
his officers were disloyal.
request.

The Mexican Senate made a similar

Madero ignored these and had tvlO of his officers,

Colonels Riverol and Izquerdo, killed. 55

It may be noted that

Madero executed men who had plotted against the constitutional
govermaent.

There is no similarity betvreen the deaths of

Colonels Riverol and Izquerdo and the death of l:Iadero.
In an interview with a reporter, ex-president Taft
spoke ,"Ii th regard to the personal guilt of the Mexican
administration:
Wilson ought to have
nized Huerta in the first
Of course, it wouldn't do
novJ'. It's all very noble

---------53 Bell~

recogplace.
any good
and

...
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rents Which Have Occurred"""'"TIiere (Ailrialsof the American
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altruistic to say that you'won't
shake a b~ood stained hand, but
where in Mexico, right now, is he
going to find any other kind of
hand to shalce?56
.Ambassador Wilson pointed out that citizens of the United

.

States were lending aid to the revotll~tionary elements in the
northern Mexican states.

There were also radical elements in

the United States who advocated

inte~ention

and vJOuld assist

the northern states to become independent so that in time they
could become incorporated in the United States.

The Ambassador

further stated that while such elements were in the minority,
the fact of our 'withholding recognition gave 'weight to the
rumor that the administration supported such a group.57
In the HOuse of Representatives, the President met

\~th

opposition, especially, on the part of the Republican party,
to his recognition policy.

Representative Ainey, Republican ,....
from Pennsylvania, attacked the new policy on the grounds that
it departed from the traditional practice as set forth in the
message of President Pierce to Congress, May 15, 1856:
It is the established policy of
the United States to recognize all
governments \nthout questiGn of
their source or organization, or of

.'

56 ChE'.rles Willis Thompson, Presidents I tve ~own ~ Two
NelU! Presidents, lbbbs-IvIerrill Company, Indianapolis,

19m, 245.

57 Fore~gn Relations, 1913, 1955.
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the means by which the governing
persons obtain their power provided there by a government de
facto accepted by the peopleof
the country.58

.'

Representative Ainey charged that it was more necessary to
. ...-,
apply that rule to the Spanish A~er~can people in considera-

,.

tion of the frequent and "not seldom anomalous changes of
organization or administration which

~hey

undergo and the

revolutionary character of most of the changes. n59

However,

Representative Ainey took no notice of the final clause which
stated that the government should "be accepted by the people."
On the other hand, it is true that little attention has been
paid to that particular sentiment in recognizing Latin
A~erican

governments which had been set up since.

This waS

probably due to the difficulty of ascertaining public opinion
in the Latin American nations which are composed of rural
populations lacking adequate communications and publicity
facilities.
On one occasion Representative Ainey denounced Wilson's
recognition policy in the follo\nng terms:
I

Starting 1n th a false promise
which has led him to run counter
to approved diplomatic precedents
in refusing to reco~lize the de
facto government of General Huerta

58 Quoted in Congressional Record, 63 Cong. 2 sess. Febr. 25,
1914, 3927.
59 Ibid., 3927.
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and in making demands so drastic
in character and contrary to the
announced and longstanding policy
of non-interference of this government as to be in themselves under
the law of nations acts of war,
the President has found himself
unsupported by a s1n~le nation
other than the negative support
which may be implied by the obedience
of three South American Republics to
the request of the United States to
~~thhold for the pres,nt their recognition of General Huerta. 60

.'

Another critic of Wilson's Mexican policy in the House of
Representatives was Representative Mondell of Wyoming, also a
Republican.

He charged the administration's foreign policy

vr.lth lack of integrity.

International policy, he said, was

not consistent 'N1. th Mexican policy:
We maintain the friendliest
relations 'with a man in power in
China ••• who recently dismissed a
parliament.
We have recently recognized
as President of Peru a man who has
not half the constitutional claim
or right to authority that Huerta
has in Mexico. 61
The London Times declared:
The only thing that seems
certain is that neither Gen.
Huerta nor any other president
vdll be recognized until there
has been a regular election.

60 Ibid., March 25, 1914, 5494.
61 Ibid., February 27, 1914, 4050.
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The determination of the administration in this regard is bitterly
regretted by those who know Mexico. 62

•..

Thus the policy of President Wilson remained incomprehensible to men who were used to dealing 'with hard facts and
not the interpretation of
remained steadfast.

.

principl~:

Nevertheless, Wilson

How Walter Hines Page defended the policy

.

to Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, is mentione
in a letter to Wbodrow Wilson:

I have explained to him how
the policy that we all too easily
have followed for a long time of
recognizing any sort of adventurer
in Latin America had, of course,
simply encouraged revolutions; that
you had found something better than
any mere policy, namely, a principle;
that policies change but principles
do not. 63
So passed the first phase of 'Nilson ~ s recognition policy

In Mexico.

Wilson had seized this opportunity to uphold

morality in international principles.

~

Unfortunately, he

chose to exercise his policy in'regard to a country which had
not yet achieved democracy.

The principles and institutions

which had formulated Wilson's political theories, Vlere alien
~

to the conditions and institutions characteristic of Mexico.
"'..

When President Wilson recognized the revolutionary government

62 London Daily Times; July 14, 1913, 8.
63 BUrton J. Henarick, Life and Letters of VIal ter' Hines Page,
Doubleday, Page and Company, New York-;J.925, I, 186.

,

r
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of Peru in February, 1914 his critics accused him of
tency.

~consis

However, Wilson evidently classed the situation in

Peru on a par with that which had taken place when Madero over/

threw Diaz; for Bryan had 'tvritten him:
It appears that the President
of Peru was ousted, not only by an
ambitious despot, but by members of
the Congress, supported by the army
against the president v"rho \'Jished to
be the dictator. The ~oup d t etat
met the approval of congress, judiciary,
clergy and people. Order was restored
under the de facto government. 64

...

.

64 William Jennings Bryan to Woodrow Wilson, February 11, 1914,
Baker, IV, 251.

.'
CHAPTER III
AUGUST 1913-JULY 1914
After five months, President

V~~on's

policy of non-

recognition had produced no tangible results.

In August,

1913, he resolved to take a more positive course of action.

He told Ray Baker, his friend and bi~~rapher, that:
His [Wilson's] Mexican policy
was based upon t,ro of the most
deeply rooted convictions of his
life. First, his shame as an
American over the first Mexican
War, and his resolution that there
should never be another such '
predatory enterprise'. Second,
upon his belief in the principle
laid d01v.n in the Virginia Bill of
Rights, that a people has the
right to do as they damn please
with their ovm affairs. He
wanted to give the Mexicans a
chance to try.
'It may prove,' he said,
'that V~ shall have to go in
finally and make peace.' He •••
said, that the greatest trouble
was not wi th Mexico, but with
people here in America who wanted
the oil and metals in Mexico and
were seeking intervention in order
to get them. 1
.
Wilson had indicated his disapproval of the Mexican War mttny
years earlier when he referred to it as a "war of ruthless

---------1 Baker, IV, 74.
46
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aggrandizement."2
enterprise."

Here he indicated his dislike of

ft~edatory

Yet at that very moment the United states

Marines occu:pied Nicaragua.

Later in his administration,

United states troo:ps vrould occu:py Santo Domingo, Haiti, and
Mexico itself.
In Nicaragua the customs were administered by a United

'.

States agent and marines had been there since the Taft
administration.

Santo Domingo was in a state of insurrection.

Secretary of State Bryan announced, March 1913, that the
United States vrould intervene if an unconstitutional grou:p
should seize povrer. 3 Evidently the Wilson administration
considered itself the sole judge of whether or not a government was constitutional.
Santo Domingo in 1914.

The United States sent troops to
Wilson's administration was also to

.

intervene in Haiti in 1915 after a bloody revolution against
President Villbrun Sam, who had been recognized by the
Euro:pean :powers but not by the United States. 4 In spite of
Wilson's avowals to let nations settle their o,vn affairs, the
United States intervened frequently in Latin American politics
during

hi~

administration.

His statement that the Mexicans had a right to do as they

---------2 Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion, 1$29-1909, Longmans,
Green and Company, New YorK;" 1912, 152.
3 BemiS, 190.
4 ~., 192.
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pleased in Mexico was contradicted
by his action, taken that
.
same month, August 1913, of sending John lind to Mexico with
proposals pertinent to reorganizing its government.
Wilson had a peculiar method of dealing with problems
which were unfamiliar to him.

He

dia- not

d~sire advice or

guidance or even information. 5 He was himself an amateur in
politics and knew little about foreigf affairs; yet he refUsed
to take the advice of authorities or even listen to them.
Henry Stoddard, a Washington journalist, stated that Wilson
hated to listen to suggestions and gave as his reason that he
did not want his actions nor his mind swayed by personalities.6
Charles Thompson, another Washington journalist, 'wrote:
No body v{ho was competent to
tell him the truth could get his
ear, could even get to his presence.
It soon became a stock joke among
people who came to Washington eager
to lay their knowledge of Mexican
conditions before him that the
only vlay to get to him was to tell
Tumulty fhis secretary1 that you
had never been in Mexico.7
Thompson fUrther asserts that once Wilson made up his mind to
something he did not want to hear any information which might
#

upset his decision.

"Consequently he refUsed to consult the

Ambassador to Mexico or take information from a lesser
official.

Instead he sent unofficial emissaries as

~ Thompson, 253.
Stoddard, 483.
7 Thompson, 681.

.,. .

,
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inexperienced as himself. u8

."

He had decided to send a personal representative to
Mexico, someone who would
report to him.

~ee

the situation at first hand and

His first choice was William Bayard Hale, a

prominent journalist.

,:.;. .4,

Ray Baker says of him,

ft • • •

a brilliant

journalist who was, however, temperamentally unfitted for such
a task.,,9

Hale felt that there was s~me cO!U1ection between

Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson and General Huerta. He
recommended that the .Ambassador be wi thdravm. lO It was a
peculiar situation, a personal representative of the President
criticizing and judging a duly appointed Ambassador.
result the Ambassador

VTaS

recalled.

As a

The presence, in Mexico,

of William Hale can hardly have been a pleasure to Ambassador
Wilson and other accredited officials.
lar vd th the Mexicans.

Hale was very unpopu,

"Violent denunciations [Of him] fillec;".

the Mexican newspapers for several days.nll

William Bayard

Hale fUrther recommended that the United States intervene to
establish order in Mexico, as it had in Cuba, Nicaragua, and
San to Domingo.
Vlood:z:pVl '!Ililson considered himself an advocate of nonintervention and so rather than accede to Halels plan he·sent '

,8 Ibid., 681.

9

~r,

IV; 243.

10 Ibid., IV" 255.
11 CEiOago Daily Tribune, August 18, 1913, 2.
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yet another envoy to Mexico.

There was no precedent

send-

f~r

ing personal representatives to transact state business; yet
Wilson did not consult congress nor inform it of his plans. 12
After Wilson had been in office a short time it was
suggested that he establish better'~e~ations with congress by
discussing policies ,vlth them.

He stated:

I can make better headway
by giving consideratiot. to my .
own ideas, whipping them into
shape, testing them out in my
own vlay, and insuring their
adoption by their own fairness
and merit. I waste no time while
I am engaged in such a work. l3
The egotism expressed in such

v~rks

is undeniable.

It explains

why he did not consult congress in selecting his newest envoy
to Mexico.

The man chosen waS John Lind, former Governor of

Iv1innesota and a Bryan man.

Lind was a man viTi th no diplomatic

experience, no familiarity with Latin American affairs, and
ability to converse in Spanish.

~

He lacked the obvious quali-

ties necessary for his extraordinary mission.

Edith

OtShaughnessy, wife of the Mexican Charge dfaffairs, puts it
very aptly:

Lind's "entry on the Mexican stage was certainly

#

abrupt, and the setting completely unfamiliar, so some very

..

.,

natural barking of shins was the result.,,14

12 Thompson, 261.
13 Stoddard, 481.
14 O'Shaughnessy, 3.

Charles Thompson

,
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wri tes

0

f Lind:
A more unfit person could not
have been sent, nor one mentally
and constitutionally less capable
of understanding Mexicans or treating ~dth them, than thi!5honest
Minnesota Scandinavian.
,10 '•.,

.'

Lind was sent vdth a set of proposals to present to
Gen~ral

Huerta.

August 14.

These proposals were placed in Huerta's hands

A preface stated that th~United States could no

longer stand inactive while conditions continued to get worse
in Mexico; that Huerta did not represent the people; and
finally, that Mexico was no longer in a position to fulfill
her foreign obligations.

The proposal itself stated that an

armistice between the revolutionary parties in Mexico must be
effected; Huerta must pledge himself not to be a candidate and
agree to abide by the result of the elect~on.16

It did not

explain how an election could be considered free vlhen one of """
the candidates was not allowed to run; and it took a great
deal upon itself in stating that Huerta did not represent the
will of the people.

Woodrow Wilson was hardly qualified to

judge the unexpressed vdll of the Mexican people.
Two d.ays later, Lind received a reply from the Mexican

..

"'

Foreign Minister, Gamboa.

The reply was couched in diplomatic

terms vmich pointedly revealed the lack of logic embodied in

15 Thompson, 261.
16 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 1 sess., 3803.

,

52
the Wilsonian proposals.

In answer to the avowal of fziendship

and peace, Gamboa pointed out that the nations vrere not at war.
It is not customary for one nation to send to another nation
unofficial envoy avo'wing peace and then proceding to lay dovm
terms for the latter nation to

.

foll~~

in regard to domestic

policies.

.
the Mexican minister pointed out that Huerta con-

AnSirering the charge that Huerta did not represent the
people,

trolled 18 out of 27 states, the three territories and the
Federal District.

As for fulfilling international obligations,

no complaints had been registered by any other nation.
was meeting all creditors.
itself.

An

Mexico

The domestic trouble affected only

armistice, Gamboa stated, could be applied only to

warring factions not to bandits such as were troubling Mexico.
Gamboa also mentioned that evidently the United States regarded Huerta as

~

facto President since it asked him to

exercise the prerogative of holding an election.

As for

Huerta's candidacy, it could be determined only at the polls.
Gamboa's message said:
Inasmuch as the government
of the United States is willing
to act in the most disinterested
friendship, it will be difficult
for it to find a more propi tuous
opportunity than the following:
if it 'would only vmtch that no
material and monetary assistance
is given to rebels who find refuge,
conspire and provide themselves

.'
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r
vdth arms aRd food on the other
side of the border; if it vrould
demand from its minor and local
authorities strictest observance
of the neutrality lavm, I assure
you, M:r. Confidential Agent, that
the complete pacification of this
republic '\'JOuld be ac.complished
vnthin a relatively 'short time. 1 7
1~lson

.,'

had professed his interest in abating civil strife in

Mexico and yet much of that strife

wa~

initiated vdthin the

border of the United states where he had the pov,rer to stop
such action.
On the 25th of August, Lind sent another note to Gamboa
asking for only tvlO concessions; that an election be held, as
previously announced, oil October '26th, in accordance with the
consti tution and that Huerta i\TOuld not run for office.

The

note further implied that if these proposals vrere accepted it
'\rould be made relatively easy for Mexico to obtain a much
needed loan from the United States. 18
If Mexico acts immediately
and favorably upon the foregoing
suggestions, President Wilson 'will
express to American bankers th~
assurances that the Government of
the United states inll look with
fav?r u~Qn an immediate loan to
MexJ.co. '9

.,.

17 Foreign Relations, 1913, 825.
18 George Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota, University of
Minnesota Press, 19~2rr.-19 Bell, 361.
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Wilson who had such high ideals in regard to governmeat was
insulting the Mexicans by assuming that they would sell their
sovereignty for a much needed loan.

It is interesting to note

that when President Wilson revealed the contents of his notes

.

to Mexico, before the United State'!!! tongress, he omitted to
mention this offer of a loan. 20 Tb this latest note, Gamboa

.
forbidden to run for office and furthennore that the Mexican

replied by pointing out that under the constitution Huerta vres

government could get along without any such tainted loans.
He re sponded :
••• the United states of .America
insinuates that it will recommend
to American bankers the immediate
extension of a loan ••• to the end
that, moved by petty interests we
should renounce a right which
incontrovertably upholds us at a
period vlhen the dig~ity of a
nation is at stake.
The right Gamboa spoke of was Mexico's right to choose its
ovm government 'without interference.

Wilson's proposal was

considered a publicly offered bribe. 22
~

Lind's mission had served to do nothing more than increase
the friction
between the Mexican and United States governments.
#
Huerta was incensed because Wilson sent dovm a man who was an· .
unaccredited representative of the United States to do businesf

20 Ibid., 361.
21 l3eI!, 362.
22 Priestley, 422.
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vdth the Mexican govermnent, which the United states government did not recognize as exis'ting.

Ambassador Henry Lane

Wilson wrote that John Lind was an insult to authorities in
his demands upon Huerta to step from office. 23
incensed by the nature of the

.

propb~hlS

He waS further

Lind conveyed to him.

Tb Huerta, these proposals eeemed to be a mere interference
in the domestic concerns of the Mexican nation •

•

The American public mistrusted Lind because of his lack
of qualifications and the secrecy involved in his mission.
One of the papers wrote:
•••Mr. Lind is an able and highminded man but no other government
would dream of selecting a representative upon grounds of a mere
political favor or private merit ••• 24

Meanwhile Congress was protesting the secrecy of the
Mexican negotiations.

While it 'was the Chief Executive f s

.....
right to deal w'ith foreign states the Senate felt that it had
a right to be informed.

The Foreign Relations Committee felt

it should have some part in advising the President or at least
some knowledge of his activities in regard to Mexico.
Gallinge~,

Republican from New Hampshire, protested:
I have sometimes vlondered •••
if it might not be well for the
President to take the Senate into

Senator

..

23 Henry Lane Wilson, Errors With Reference to Mexico, 148.
24 Chicago Daily Tribune, Au~11, 1913, 14:

r
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his confidence and communicate
to this bOdy through some source
- properly the Committee on
Foreign Relations in executive
session - precisely what the
instructions were that vrere given
to Mr. Lind. 2 )

.'

Senator Fall remarked:
·I realize as everyone else
does, that the details of negotiations of a diplomatic ~aracter
must necessarily be kep~ from the
public.
It "Jill be very much better
(in my opinion) to follow the advice
of one of the men who said ••• that it
was the duty and much the best policy
that the President take into confidence ••• the Senate of the United
States in such m~5ters as this
Mexican problem.
President Vfilson addressed Congress on August 27, 1913,
ansvrering their demands for information concerning Lind's
activities.

He disclosed the instructions he had given to Lind
,riI>

and also stated that the proposals had been rejected. The only
course left was to urge all Americans to leave Mexico and to
protect those who refused to leave.

In this message he first

mentions his policy of "watchful waiting":
#

We have waited many months,
months full of peril and anxiety,
for the conditions there to improve,
and they have not improved ••• the
prospect of the pacification of the
country, even by arms, has seemed to

25 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 1 sess., 3570.
26 Ibid., 3570.
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grow more and more remote ••• It
.'
was our duty to volunteer our
good offices -- to offer to
assist ••• in effecting some
arrangement which would bring
relief and peace and set up a
univer~ally ackn~~ledged political
author~ty there. "/ ',,',
,.,. .,.
Wilson ignored the Mexican charges that the United states was
not enforcing the neutrality laws.

He told the Congress that

he had volunteered the good offices ot the United States.

The

fact that an unofficial envoy, a personal representative of
the President, rather than an accredited official was sent
seems to belie the "good offices. n

His good offices seemed to

consist in laying dovm conditions for the authorities in
Mexico to follow.

Except for the United States and a few

satelite Latin AJnerican states, the Huerta government was the
universally acknowledged authority in

Mex~co.

Senator Works of California criticized the President's """
actions as follovls:
Nm'l why should these propositions be made to Huerta? According
to the position we had taken, he was
only a private citizen of a foreign
country \vi thout any official standing
or authority •••• first was a demand for
a cessation of fighting throughout
Mexico ••• Did the President really
think a few private citizens in Mexico
could declare an armistice or stop

27 Ibid., 3803.

...
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the fighting that was going on a l l . '
over Mexi'co? •• The next! that a
free election be held, ~n which all
,~11 agree to take a part ••• the
President was calling for an election such as was never held in Mexico
.nd probably never will be ••• The next
demand, namely, that. Huerta should
bind himself not to'~e a candidate
for President of his OVID country
was nothing less than preposterous.
What right had the President of the
United states to insist that a
citizen of a foreign c~untry should
not be a candidate at a "free election"
••• it was further demanded that all
parties ••• should abide by the result
of the election ••• It must have been
a public-spirited people that would
allow the head of a foreign nation
to diotat~8how they should hold an
election.
In early October, John Lind sent word that Huerta vmS
attempting to manipulate the coming election so he would
remain in power.

~

Belisario Dominguez had, delivered an anti-

Huerta speech to the Mexican Senate in the latter part of
September.

/

Shortly thereafter, Dominguez disappeared.

~

Rumour

reported him dead and the congress felt that the administration
had something to do vJith his disappearance.
denied any knowledge of his whereabouts.
#

The administration /'

October 10th, the

...
The following day,

Mexican Chamber of Deputies passed resolutions to investigate
the mysterious disappearance of Dominguez.

---------28 Ibid., 63 Cong., 2 sess., 4405.
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I

the Minister of Gobernacion
appeared in the Chamber
,

o~'

Deputies and demanded reconsideration of these resolutions.
The President of the Chamber adjourned the session, whereupon

110 deputies were arrested and sent to the penitentiary. 29
Congress was then dissolved.

.

Huer~a~announced that elections

'would be held and a new Chamber of Deputies 'would assemble in
November.

TIJ,Q days later, Huerta

.

is~ued

a decree taking upon

himself the legislative functions of Congress until the new
Congress should be elected.
As the date of the presidential election approached,

Huerta attempted to rally his forces by urging them to present
a united front against their aggressive neighbor to the north.
In a typical Mexican election, Huerta was proclaimed President.
The usual procedure was for a strong man to seize the govern,

ment and then to hold elections which would ratify his government.

Polls were supervised by the authorities in power.

Ballots differed for the various parties so the balloting was
not secret. 30

Woodrow Wilson was nov, determined that

Victoriano Huerta must go.
major

pow~rs

The United states notified the

of Europe and Latin America of the attitude of

the administration and invited foreign cooperation to seeure
Huerta's voluntary retirement. 31

29 Forei~ Relations, 1913, 836.
30 Gruen~ng,394.
31 Baker, ~T, 289.
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Shortly thereafter, President Wilson sent William-' Bayard

.

Hale to Mexico to interviewVenustiano Carranza.

This was the

first open indication that Wilson was seeking a successor for
General Huerta.

About

t~is

time, Sir William Tyrell, in an

.

interview with President Wilson, met~loned that he could not
see much difference among Huerta, Carranza and Villa.
replied that Carranza

v'laS

Wilson

the best of. the three and Villa was

not as bad as he v~s painted. 32

It was later said that

"between the grafting governor, the bandit, and the government
of the United States, Huerta was crushed.,,33

Carranza and

sixty-four of his officers had signed the Plan of Guadalupe,
March 26, 1913.

This docUL1ent declared that Carranza vms. Chief

of the Constitutionalist liI'ID.Y, and executive power vras to be
vested in him when Mexico City was taken.

Carranza promised to

hold elections as soon as peace and order had been restored.
Villa and Carranza had entered an agreement on July S, 1913, by
'1Nhich Carranza ','fas aclmowledged Commander-in-Chief of the
Constitutionalist Army.

His background was superior to that

of Francisco Villa, who had been a notorious bandit in the
northern

M~xican

states.

Villa,

v,,-1 th

his .Almyof the North

and its alliance with Carranza acllieved for the time being an
aspect of respectability.

32 Ibid., 289.
33 K'eIIey, 209.
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The United states d,id not take Idndly to the idea·'of a
Mexican administration headed by Villa; this attitude 'I.'Tas
reflected by the press.

The Philadelphia Inquirer, a Republi-

can paper, stated that to reject Huerta and accept Villa

,. .4.

tTwould be to invite the contempt of all civilized nations. n
The New York Evening NIail, a Progressive paper, wrote:
If Mr. Wilson suoieeds in
substituting Villa for Huerta, he
vall find that he has progressed
from the f~ying pan into the fire.
The Philadelphia Public

Ledg~,

an Independent organ,

v~ote:

Having refused recognition to
Huerta on high moral grounds, are
we now to become partners in crime
va th a man so brutal that the City
of Ivlexico is nanic-stricken at the
mere threat of his advance?34
President 'Wilson reiterated his confidence in "watchful
waiting" in a statem.ent to Congress, December 2, 1913:
There can be no prospect of
peace until General Huerta has
surrendered his usurped authority
in Mexico; until it is understood
on all hands, indeed that such
pretended governments v.d.ll not be
countenanced or dealt vvi th by the
government of the United states.
We are the friends of constitutional
government in Al.l1erica; ','re are more
than its friends, we are its
champions •••I'lIexico has no government.
The attempt to maintain one at
Mexico City has broken dO\'JIl and a

34 Quoted in the Lite.rary Digest, May 23, 1914, 1237.

62

r
mere military despotism has been
set up wnich has hardly more than
the semblance of national authority •••
Every day his pov!er and prestige are
crumbling and the collapse is not far
away. Vie shall not, I believe, be
obliged to alter our po licy of watchful '\;'rai ting. 35
'. .
,9

.'

<

...,

While the President followed the policy of n"Natchful 1'lai ting, If
he v!as carefully deter-m.ining which of the insurgent leaders
vvas best qualified to succeed Huerta.· His policy was not as
negative as his speech ,\vould lead one to believe.
Great Britain had given its support to Huerta from the
the time of his accession to power.

Relations between

Bri tain and Mexico had been very amicable vii th Sir Lionel
Carden, British Ambassador, making the most of Mexico's break
wi th the United states.

President Y/ilson directed Walter

Hines Page, the American Ambassador to London, to inform,the
British Foreign Minister that if Huerta did not retire by
force of circumstance, it vrould be the duty of the United
States to use less peaceful means to put him out. 36

It waS in

November, 1913 that Sir Lionel Carden led a procession of
diplomats in advising Huerta to yield to President Wilson's
~

demands.

This about face on the part of the British

Ambassador's actions vvas caused by a directive from the
British Office of Foreign Affairs stating that he must not

35 congress~onal Record, 63 Cong., 2 sess., 4343.
36 Daniels, 208.
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interfere vnth Wilsonts,anti-Huerta policy.37

.'

Great Britaints reversal of her Mexican policy seems to
have been connected \nth her desire for the repeal of the
Panama Canal tolls.

American coastwise
. shipping was exempt
,. 47

from paying tolls.

Britain contended that this was unfair.

It was charged that the Panama Tolls Act violated the HayPauncefote Treaty of 1901.

Colonel J4luse met Sir Edward Grey,

British Foreign Minister, and intimated that if Britain ,,.iIOuld
change its Mexican policy, Wilson vrould do his best to repeal
the tolls exemptions. 38

The American Congress was not

enthusiastic about repealing the exemption but Colonel House
met members of the Senate Foreign Relations cownittee and
explained the situation.

In his ovm viIOrds:

We decided ••• to call the Senate
. Foreign Relations Committee ••• and
explain the situation to them; that
it vi01.l1d be vvell to tell them how
important it vms at this particular
time that our relations with Great
Britain should be undisturbed; that
it was better to make concessions
in regard to Panama than lose the
support of England, in our Mexican
Central and South American policy.~9
It was

ne~essary

for Yalson to reveal his plans to the Senate,

othervlise it would not have repealed the Panama Canal 'lb11s
Act.

In November, Britain reversed its Mexican policy and in

37 Charles Seymour, Intimate paters of Colonel House, Houghton
Mifflin Company, BOston, 192 , !,202.
38 Ibid., 194.
Daniels 182.
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January the United states repealed the tolls
Colonel House believed that the

vvithdrav~l

exemptio~~

of British support

caused Huerta's do¥mfall; Britain's support had been Huerta's
strongest international asset.

John Lind felt that the

.

differences between the contending '9f ;(ctions 'WOuld have been
settled but for the support Huerta received from European
governments.

This support enabled hif to sustain himself.40

Lind had by this time become an advocate of intervention.
Secretary of State Bryan strongly opposed intervention.

A

biographer of Bryan states that Wilson and Bryan did not alway
get along well because they both had fixed ideas.

In regard

to intervention, nIt v;as felt at the time, that had it not

been for Bryan, vrho declared he would stand for peace until
the bitter end, the Mexican situation might have been summarily settled. n 41 However, contrary to the above assumption,
~

Bryan himself states in his memoirs:
I vms gratified to find the
President resolutely opposed to
intervention except as a last resort,
and I regarded his refusal to yield
to pressure on this subject as one of
the most meritorius acts of his
administration. 42

40 Ibid., 182.
41 Genevieve Forbes Herrick and John Origen Herrick:, The Life
of Valliam Jennin~Bryan, George Buxton, Chicago,~5~.
42 Wflliam Jennings
an and Mary Baird Bryan, The Memoirs
of William Jennings I?rYan, John Winston CompaiiY,'" Chicago,

'1925, 361.
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Joseph Tumulty, Preside~t Wilson's secretary, also sta~es that
the President had tvJO considerations; they were:
The fina conviction that all
nations, both the weak and the
po·1tlerful, have the inviolable right
to control their in~r~ational
affairs.
The belief, established from
the history of the world, that
Mexico will never become a peaceful
and lavl-abiding neigh~r of the
United states until she had been
permitted to achieve a permanent
and basic settlement of her troubles
without outside interference.43
Therefore Wilson and Bryan Vlere in accord on the Mexican
policy.

They professed intervention as evil and yet their

policy eventually led them to intervene.
John Lind sent dispatches to Washington urging that
Uni ted States forces occupy Tampico or even Mexico City.
Wilson refused to consider these.
lifting the arms embargo. 44

He was nOVl thin...ldng of

Huerta was getting arms from

43 Joseph P. Tumulty, VloodrovrWilson As I Know Him, Doubleday, ,.
Page and Company, New York, 1921, 145-; -.
'.
44 Ray Baker in Life and Letters of Wbodrov',r Wilson, IV, 298,
suggests that~son O'Shaughnessy, the Charge d'affairs of
the 'AInEJrican Embassy from the time of Henry Lane 17ilson's
recall to the fall of Vera Cruz, had first suggested the
repeal of the arms embargo.· This seems unlikely in trfe
face of remarks made by Mrs. 0 t Shaughnessy in her book A
Diplomat's Wife ~ Mexico. She disapproved of the action.
"This act 'will not establish the rebels in Mexico City or
anywhere else, but vnll indefinitely prolong the civil war.
page 175. Nowhere does she mention that her husband recommended'or even anproved of the act.
45 Baker, IV, 298.
~
46 Foreign Relations, 1914, 444.
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Europe, while the rebels were able to smuggle only
quanti ties across the border. 45

sm~l

1/7hile 'Wilson pondered the

idea, he was approached by a group of men representing various
European nations.

They proposed to ask Huerta to resign on

.

the condition that the United state1 give an assura~ce of
U

pacification afterwards. 46

Wilson refused.

He decided to

lift the arms embargo and let Mexico tight out its civil

~~r.

This Etep is difficult to reconcile vath his theory of
political morality.

By

this action he was made responsible

for much of the ensuing bloodshed in Mexico.

He had resolved

to avoid direct intervention and yet the repeal of the arms
embargo amounted to interference in a negative sense.

He

could have avoided this by aereeing to the proposal of the
European po·wers.

Evidently his determination to oust Huerta

had reached the point where he refUsed to consider any course

~

of action which was tantamount to compromise.

He had opposed

Huerta, calling him a murderer, yet by this action he was
multiplying murderers.

He had objected to Huerta taking povrer

by force; nov; he was promoting the idea of civil strife.
The

~s

embargo was removed February 3, 1914.

Even

before that time munitions had been allov18d to go througl'r to
Villa and Carranza. 47

47 Bemis, 177.

John Lind was counseling direct

,
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finan~ial aid to the Constitutionalist forces.48

The~emoval

of the arms embargo served to reassert Wilson's policy to the
world.
armies.

r-t affirmed his support of the Constitutionalist
And it led to immediate consequences •

.

,. "7

Acts of violence shortly occurred.

One of the first

cases involved a British mining man named Benton, who was
killed by Villa.
confiscated.

Benton's property

i~

Chihuahua had been

Villa announced that Benton waS shot after a

court martial had found him guilty of making an attempt on
Villa's life.

The incident vms prolonged by Villa's refusal

to give up the body to Benton's \,life.

The British government

issued a protest backed up by the other European nations; and
pointed out that the responsibility rested vdth the United
States.

Edward Bell points out:
••• the fonnidable reputation of'
the British government for protecting
its citizens seemed to make some
action necessary on the part of the
United States, which was the guardian
of Mexico, ,and in a very special
sense the guardian of the Constitutionalists whose nominal chief "vas
Carranza. 49

By giving#support to the Constitutionalists Wilson stood
behind their actions.
leaders.

Villa was one of the Consti tutionA1.ist .

Britain asked that the United states investigate the

48 O'Shaughnessy, 200.
49 Bell, 380.
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death.

The United state,s accepted the responsi bili ty ••'

In March, 1914, a proposal vvas made by Oscar S. Straus of
New York, who had a plan to send a conunission of inquiry to
Mexico. 50 Men such as John Bassett Moore, Richard Olney, and

.

Judge Gray were suggested.

Wilson'1-e'plied that under the

circumstances it seemed impossible for such a commission to
visit Mexico.

Huerta and Carranza

ha~

been sounded on the

proposal and had been favorably disposed.

Wilson did not act

on the proposal.
Gunboats vvere patrolling the coast of Mexico for the
protection of Americans and their interests and also in
anticipation of a possible blockade.

On April 9, 1914,

Paymaster Conn of the Dolphin and seven unarmed men landed at
Iturbide Bridge, Tampico.

While they vJere loading the tender

"vi th supplies an officer with a squadron of Huerta f s men

arrested them.

Two of the crew were taken off the boat which

fle'w' the United States flag.

While the Americans were being

taken through the streets they were met by a superior officer
of Huerta's army who told the officer to take them back to the
dock.

Af~er

an hour and a half they were released.

General

Zaragoza of Huerta's army said that the officer who had .'
arrested them waS ignorant of the laws of war and was carrying

--------50 Baker, IV, 311.

out instructions not to let any boat land at the dock.·' Huerta,
himself, joined vri th the Commander in chare;e of the forces in
eA~ressing his regret. 51

Ac1m.iral Uayo hOi'IeVer, took it upon himself to send an

.

.;p .;,

ultimatum to the Huerta forces asking for a fonnal apology and
assurance that the officer in charee 'would be punished.

His

demand stated that Huerta should
••• publically hoist the lilllerican
flag in a prominent l)osi tion on
shore and salute it vIi th tvrentyone guns, vIhi ch salute 'will be
duly returned by this ship.52

TO this Huerta sent his expression of regret and assurance
that the officer who had arrested the men v'Jould be punished.
He asked that the ul timatl..1TI regarding the salute be vIi thdravm.
General Huerta justified his officerts action on the grounds
that Tampico "TaS under martial 1m! and orders had been issued......
that no one had the right to land at Iturbide Bridge.
The incident itself received attention entirely out of
proportion to its actual nature.

Washington

tempori~ed

extended the time gi ven to Huerta to malce' the s alu te •
gave the

~erican

da~anded

This

and Mexican public time to become aware of

the incident and to become inflamed about it.
matum

and

Had the ulti-

immediate reSDonse the issue might have failed

51 Forei~n Relations, 1914, 451.
52 Danie s, 186.

70

to attract so much attention. 53

A few men had been a~ested;

released after a short period of time and the Mexican
officials had apologized.

But the United States chose to

emphasize the incident and Inagnify the details. The A~erican
.
,;;. .;.,
sailors denied Imovrledge of the state of martial law in
Tampico.

The very fact that they landed unarned proves their

lack of v"larlike intentions.

It is

PG~si ble

that Huerta's

officer thought the Alnericans were deliberately showing contempt for Huertats declaration of martial law.

But the fact

that the .Americans VTere released after such a short time
indicated that the event waS not considered in such a light.
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, felt that the
incident was receiving undue emphasis, he said:
I found that in the state and
Navy Departments I '-vas alm0st alone
in feeling that Mayo, when apologies
Vlere promptly offered should have
accepted them.54
President

~~lson

and the other officials backed up Mayo in his

demand for a salute.

Secretary Daniels also questioned Mayots

right to deliver an ultimatum without first consulting his
government.; he 'wrote:
'When the news of the arrest
and the ultimatum for the salute
reached the Navy Department it
seriously disturbed me. I felt

53 Bell, 389.
54 Daniels, 191.

,
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strongly that, inasmuch as the
admiral vias in easy reach of
Washington by 'wireless and telegraph,
he should not have issued the
ultimatulU without the authority of
the government. He acted upon the
old time Naval practice which guided
Perry in Japan and q..)JtJ,er Naval
officers in foreign '!;vaters. Of
necessity, without cable or wireless,
a naval officer is sometimes compelled
to act upon his judgement, being unable
to get direction fromihe Secretary
of the Navy. But when the wireless
and cable enable him to get into
quick communication vIi th his government, there is an indisposition on
the part of some officers to surrender
their diplomatic decisions. There is
still adherence to a theory that
'strength of the Naval forces
determines diplomatic policy. ,55
Daniels obviously was not in sympathy with Admiral Mayots
activity in regard to Tampico.

He mentions that a precedent

for such action had been set first by Stephen Decatur in
Tripoli, 1815; and later by Commodore Kearney in China,
and Commodore Perry in Japan, 1854.

1842~

These Naval Commanders

had conducted diplomatic negotiations vdth the aid of a strong
show of naval force and vd thout direct or immediate instructions from their government.

However, communication facili-

~

ties had improved vastly since then and Daniels felt he should
have been consulted.
issue ultimatums.

55 Ibid., 188.

Only the President has the authority to

Tb do this he must have the consent of
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Congress except in an

.'

~ergency.

Admiral Mayo, acting on some unknovm perogative, did not
vdthdraw his ultimatum but insisted that the Mexican government salute the United States flag.

Huerta made some counter-

proposals none of 'vrhich was accepta1>re to the United States. 56
He offered to salute the flag under the proviso that the
salute be returned gun for gun.
matter to the Hague Court.

He olfered to refer the

He also suggested that the Treaty

of Guadalupe Hidalgo provided for arbitration of disputes betvreen the United States and Mexico.

The United States did not

accept these proposals because their operation ,vould imply
recognition of Huerta.
President Wilson spoke to Congress on April 20, 1914.
pointed out that the incident itself

VlaS

He

not so important as

the fact that it was one of a series of such incidents which
~

shovred disrespect for the United States.

He evidently did not

feel it vms disrespectful to the Mexican nation in not recognizing its government; nor in failing to observe strict
neutrality; nor in violating Mexican laws; nor in ignoring
the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

He cited a case in which an

orderly from a ship at Vera Cruz had been throvm into jatl and .
the telegram asking for his release had been held up by the

56 Priestley, 423.'
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authorities.

Wilson felt that the frequent conflicts

inevitably lead to war.

~uld

He said:

I therefore felt it my duty
to sustain Admiral Mayo in the
whole of his demand and to insist
that the flag of the.;;.Ulli ted States
should be saluted in such a way as
to indicate a nev., spirit on the
part of the Huertistas.
Mexico is torn by civil
strife. If v!e are to .~ccept the
tests of its OVID. constItution it
has no government. General Huerta
has set his povmr up in the City of
Mexico, such as it is, ,vi thout right
and by methods for which there can
be no justification. Only part
of the territory is under his
control. If armed conflict should
unhappily come as a result of his
attitude of personal resentment
to1'lard this govermnent 'VTe should
be fighting only General Huerta
and tho s e VJho adhere to him; and
our object v~uld be only to restore
to the people of the distracted
republic the opportunity to set up
their O'wn lmiis and o,m government.
Our feeling for Mexico is one of
friendship. They are entitled to
settle their own government. I
ask for approval to use armed forces
to obtain from Huerta recognition
of our dignity and rights.57

.....

In spite of the fact that \Jar had not been declared,
#

President Wilson was ass1..U!ling authority over Congress to .,-speak
for the United States c>

He

act of one of the Admirals.

--------.:.

VIaS

upholding an unconstitutional

He could hardly e:A.,,})ect a ne\'l

...

57 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 2 sess., 6908.
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attitude on the part of the Huertistas after he had just
removed the arms embargo, an action which encouraged their
opponents.

He set himself up as a judge of Mexican politics

'when he stated that Huerta assumed pO'wer tlViTi thout right. ft

.And

in stating that Huerta did not con.er8l all of lilexico he ignora:
the Mexican tradition which considers the.man in authority at
Mexico Oi ty the head of the federal g,fvernment.

Wilson men-

tioned ffrestoring" to the Mexican people the right to set up
their own government and laws.
practice, exercised.

This right they had never, in

Vlilson had said they 'Vvere entitled to

settle their ovm government, yet he himself, waS infringing
on that right.
President Wilson attempted to reduce the conflict to a
personal one, "We should be fighting only General Huerta. tf
No doubt this was to emphaSize the fact that in spite of
demands for respect on the part of Huerta's government, Huerta
waS by no means recognized.

Thus, by his ovm. definition, the

President of the United states was using force to obtain
respect from an ino_ividual who waS not aci tizen nor an
inhabitan~

of the United states.

It 'was an awkvrard situation

'which stamped Wilson as neither logical nor diplomatic. ..'
The question of supplying armed forces to back up Admiral
Mayots demands occassioned sharp debate in the House of Representatives.

Those opposing the administration agreed that

75

the Tampico incident vms too trivial for such

drastic~easures

Many felt that should Huerta be removed from J.)O'\,'ler a devastating civil vvar V1JOuld be carried on between the remaining
factions.

Representative Mondell of Wyoming said:
I am persuaded ,·tilat the acts
and attitudes of our government
have had the effect of prolonging
and extending the lamentable conditions of appalling di~order and
distress which prevai~ in Mexico. 58

Most of the Congressmen felt that the honor of the United
States must be maintained and that Huerta must show the
respect due to his northern neighbor.

The House of Represen-

tatives passed a resolution approving of use of armed force in
obtaining Huerta t s compliance vli th the demands made by the
Uni ted States.
opposition.

Naturally there 'were some extremists in the

Senator William Borah, a member of the progressivE

1Ning of the Republican party, stated.:
If our flag is run up in
Mexico it 'will never come down.
This is the beginning of the
march of the United States to
the Panama Canal.,9
Since Huerta refUsed to order a salute to the American
flag, Adm~ral Mayo acted.

On April 21, the day after the

Presidentts message and the

58 Ibid., 4049.
59 Daniels, 190.

S~1e

day Congress agreed to give
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Y~lson

permission to

us~

armed force in Mexico, the

~rican

Navy seieed the CUstoms House at Vera Cruz and the Marines
occupied the port.

Congress also passed a joint resolution

on April 21 disclaiming any intention of making war on the
Mexican Republic. 60

The occupatio; tlf the :port was considered

necessary as a German shipment of arms was said to be
approaching.

It 'waS felt, by those vjlo so wished to feel,

that Huerta vrould use these arms against the United states.
Much bloodshed ensued.
lives vrere lost.

Several American and many Mexican

In view of the fact that Mexico and the

United states were not at war, the action is hard to justify.
The port was seized even before Congress had granted Wilson
the power to use arrlled force.
had been exercised.

The power was granted after it

The Constitution states that:

The President Shall be Commanderin-Chief of the Axmy and Navy of the
United States, and of the militia of
the United States when called into
the act%al service of the United
States. 1
By virtue of this right he called out the armed forces in

what he deemed an emergency measure.

In spite of his frequent

#

avowals of non-intervention the President had intervened in
L1exico.
Within Mexico, the seizure of the port had the effect of
60 Robertson, 471.
61 The Constitution £! the United States, Fxticle II, section

z.-

,
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unifying the country.

Anlericans were everywhere insul"lt'ed.

There \rere violent demonstrations against the Anlericans in
Tampico. 62 Even the insurrectionists disapproved. They
considered the act an invasion of their country.63

General

Carranza declared that he vms the a~~ority in Mexico and that
the American demand for a salute should have been addressed
to him.

Secretary Bryan sent, Aprili2, 1914, a note to

Carranza to explain the President's motive in trueing Vera Cruz
Carranza replied by threatening that if the United states did
not withdraw from Vera Cruz the Constitutionalists 'would join
an attempt to expel theml

This may have been bluster or per-

haps it was an attempt to vr.in the favor of the Mexicans by
shovr.ing that he, Carranza, was not merely President Wilson's
tool.

Wilson can hardly have been pleased with Carranza's

reaction.
Things were rapidly approaching the point where the
United States \rould be compelled to take further action.
Fortunately, a few days later, representatives of Argentina,
Brazil and Chile offered joint mediation.

This offered

President 4JWilson an opportunity to show his good vr.ill toward
Latin Anlerica, a sentiment which had been cast under a cloud
by his attitude tovrard Mexico.

62 Bell, 349.
63 Rippy, 352.

The ABC diplomats met, May,

,
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1914, at Niagara Falls,

~ntario;

Canada.

When 'Wilson 1iccepted

their offer to mediate he stated that he hoped :Mexicans who
spoke for the masses of the people VJould be consulted. 64

His

recommendation vms of its nature difficult as most of the
,., 4?

people had allied themselves vri th one or another of the contending factions.
General Huerta accepted mediatioi shortly after President
Wilson did.

The first plan suggested by the mediators VTaS

that Huerta appoint as foreign minister a man acceptable to
Constitutionalists, neutrals and the United states; Pedro
Lascurain was suggested.

Huerta 1:vould then resign and the

foreign minister Vloulcl then be head

0

f the provisional govern-

ment and hold an election for the Presidency.
not please President Vlilson.
hot vlater.

This }Jlan did

He seemed bent upon staying in

He noV! felt that it looked too much as though the,..,

foreign minister vms succeeding Huerta 'with the constitutional
right of succession 'which in turn seemed to validate Huerta f s
leBal status.

Wilson, still bound to see to it that l1exicans

should manae;e their own affairs, sugeested. that Lascurain, a
Huertista 4UIld a third man should take over the provisional
governraent 1L.'Yltil elections could be held.
held in much favor by the ABC delegates.

64 Foreign Relations, 1914, 945.

This plan waS :not
They felt that
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Mexico in i ts tumultuous condition ,vas in need of a strong
provisional governnlent and three men representing different
factions would tend to disagree and thereby constitute a weak
authority.
President Wilson for some ineiPficable reason desired
the Carranza forces to succeed the Huertistas in the administration of Mexico.

Secretary Bryan s:nt a notice to the

Special Commissioners:
The object of our conference
now is to find a method by which
the inevitable can be accomplished
vdthout further bloodshed. By the
inevitable vre mean not only the
elimination of Huerta but the completion of the revolution by the transfer of political poi:V'0r from Huerta to
those who represent the interests
and aspirations of the people whos e
forces are noVl in the ascendancy. 65
Wilson felt that the mediators should insist on a Constitutionalist president.

The Huertistas were vdlling to settle

for a neutral president.

fut 'Wilson contended that the

Constitutionalists were dominant and a neutral man could not
be found. 66
the

media~ors

Wilson was anxious that the plan designated by
be acceptable to the Carranza forces.

He kept

urging the latter to confer with the mediators but the
Consti tutionalists refused to cooperate in any way.

They

denied the right of other nations to impose a government upon

65 Ibid., 1914, 506.
66 LIterary Digest, July 4, 1914, 7.
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1Iexico.
Finally the mediators recommended that the opposing
parties agree on a provisional government.

Huerta vmS to

resign and the ABC pO'l.'lerS 'would recognize the temporary

.

regime.

.• 47

The ABC mediation '\'Jas both a failure and a success.

It successfully got the President of the United States out of
an immediate difficulty.

It solved

t~porarily

the inter-

national problem bet'VJ'een the United States and :Mexico.

But

it left a progeny of other problems.
The plan

f~iled

because the opposing parties in Mexico

refused to treat 'l.'ri th one ano ther.

July 15, Huerta reSigned

after appointing Francisco Carbajal, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, his foreign minister, as Provisional President.
The United States forces vrere vr.i.. thdravm from If era Cruz the
follo'wing November.

Carranza and Villa . .·iere leading their

armies on Mexico City from the north, Zapata from the south.
Wilson had believed that Huerta's removal from the presidency
'I.'}ould bring peace to Mexico.

It did not.

From July 15, 1914,

until October 19, 1915, there was no reco'gnized government
in Mexico

~or

was there peace.

Carranza, Villa and Zapata

occupied Mexico City in rapid succession.

During this period'

Wilson continued to stand behind the Constitutionalists; but
their position vms such that not even de facto recognition
could be accorded.

During this period of tunnoil Secretary of
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state Bryan vr.rote regarding the Constitutionalists:

.'

It is evident that the united
states is the only first class povrer
that can be expected to take the
initiative in recognizing the new
government ••• Every step taken by the
Constitutionalist leaders from this
moment on and everytliing which
indicate the spirit in vmich they
mean to proceed and to consumate their
triumph must of necessity, therefore,
~lay a very important aart in deter.min~ng whether it will be j;lossi ble for
the United states to recognize the
government now being planned for. b 7
Finally the ABC nations in conjunction vnth the United States
extended recognition to Carranza, October 19, 1915, in hopes
that international support of his government vrould enable him
to restore peace.
But bloodshed continued.

In a spirit of revenge Villa

made punitive expeditions into the United, States, slaying
American citizens.

The United States protested but nothing

v,ras done by the favored Constitutionalists.

~

Carranza could

not or would not stop these expeditions and Wilson was forced
to intervene again.

Joseph Tumulty, the Presidentts secretary ,

'wri tes:

With Villa carrying on his
raids and Carranza alvmys misunderstanding the purpose and attitude
of our government and spurning its
offer of helpfUl cooperation,

---------67 Kelley, 240.
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difficulties of various sorts arose
vdth each day, until popular opinion
became insistent in its demand for
vigorous action on the part of the
American President. 68

.'

Carranza's apparent indifference to_the United States demands

.

was part of his effort to silence hi~ "Bpponents who accused
him of being "Wilson's man. tf

Wilson sent American troops

under General Pershing into Mexico to
demanded that they be withdravm.

~ursue

Villa.

Carranza

Again relations betvreen the

United States and Mexico ¥rere strained to the breaking point.
W'h.ile Pershing's army \vas in Mexico bands of Villa's men continued to make raids in United States territory.

June 22, 1916

there vmS a brief skirmish between the American army under
Pershing and some Mexican troops at Carrizal.
v~re

killed.

Several men

Carranza and Wilson finally agreed to let a joint

commission settle the dispute.

The commission decided that

each nation should patrol its ovm border.

The United States

insisted on adding a provision that it should have the right
to cross the border if IvIexico failed to keep order.
refUsed to agree to this.

Carranza

The commission was dissolved.

In MaDch, 1917, the United States recognized Carranza
de jure President of Mexico.

American interest was focussed

on the world war and the United States was anxious to be rid

68 Tumulty, 1540
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.'

of hemispheric strife.

TO cap the climax, Carranza called a Constitutional
Convention in 1917 to get rid of the confusion.
tution was drawn up and adopted.

A new consti-

This constitution iNaS hardly

.

,1- 4?

in line vr.i. th the damocratic principles Woodrow Vlilson expected
Carranza to establiSh.
.
The Convention by jts First
Article restricted the ~ights of
the Mexican citizen to those 'which
are granted him by this Constitution;' thereby reversing the democratic order that makes the people
the source of rights and the constitution the declaration of the
peoples sovereignty.o9
The constitution waS not democratic.

It waS based on the

principle that authority proceeds from the state and not from
the people.
lutism.

Hilson had rid Mexico of Huerta but not of abso-

The government now made absolutism official.

In December, 1918, Carranza went before the Mexican
Congress and asked that certain provisions of the Constitution
be mOdified.

President Wilson had been protesting against

the violent religious persecution taking place in Mexico. 70
Carranza mentioned to the Congress the fact that religious
persecution violated liberty of conscience.

The Mexican ...

Congress and the leaders of the Constitutionalist party, who

69 Kelley, 237.
70 Ibid., 241.

had been leading the anti-clerical movement becrone
Carranza was ousted.

infl~ed.

He fled to the coast and on May 20, 1920

I"laS killed.
The Constitution of 1917 had declared all subsoil deposits

.

,9 .7

the property of the national government.

Lands which had been

leased to United states firms for many years and which represented heavy investments were confisca\e<l.

This caused a

certain amount of strife vrlth the United States and prevented
the recognition of Alvaro

obreg6n ,

the man who waS elected

after Carranza's death, (there waS an interim. president
Adolfo de la Huerta}.
Carranza.

/

Obregon had led the rebellion against

He ruled in the traditional strong-handed fashion.

He put down rebellions and kept peace.
In 1924 Plutarco Calles was elected President o
I

carried on the anti-clerical persecutions of Obregon.
ruled in the dictatorial fashion.

He
He

The quality of Mexico's

presidents VIaS not improved by the elimination of Huerta.

CHAPTER rl

CONCLUSION

....

Wilson's triumph over Huerta VIaS., inevi table; the might
and unity of the United States VIaS arrayed against the 'weak'

ness 'and disunity of Mexico.

HOVlever,Wilson considered his

policy as primarily directed tovrard r~oving Huerta.

Its

essential purpose, he thought, 'was to enable Mexico to attain
a democratic representative government.

Any means tovmrd

.

accomplishing his primary and secondary aims were justifiable
in his eyes.

His policy did not enable Mexico to attain

democracy; essentially then it waS a failure.
Huerta, Wilson thought, did not represent the will of the
people.

It \\fOuld have been difficult for, a national of one

country to detennine the ,rill of nationals of another
especially a country such as Mexico.

count~

The people of Mexico

as a whole lacked education to the point iNhere they could not
be said to possess a 'will in the national sense:

Public

opinion cannot be said to exist in a country such as Mexico.
~

V~lson v~uld

recognize Carranza because he chose to

think that a man crying ttConsti tution" represented the "vvill of
the people.
people.

~~d
/

Carranza did not represent the vall of the

Jose Vasconcelos, a. Mexican, ,vri tes:
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Finally, Mr. Wilson decided
to recognize Carranza. Vie never
criticized Mr. Vlilson's choice of
Carranza instead of Villa •••what
iNe did criticize vms that any
recognition had been granted •••
One General vias recognized as a
government, exactly as-in
the
old
,'I' 41
./
days, exactly as Porf1r10 D1az,
one man, had been recognized for
many years, not only as the head
but as the body and soul of the
Mexican nation. This dlcision of
Mr. Wilson was for many of us one
of the most regretable failures of
his idealism. l
Mexico needed many reforms.

.'

These reforms would have to

be administered by a strong government.

The many warring

factions in Mexico could only be united by the force of a
I

strong man.

Such a man had been Diaz.

Madero had not been

such a man.

Huerta had been a strong administrator able to

keep the various factions in line until they were encouraged
by the United States.

Huerta had been eliminated because he

did not represent popular "viII.

Ho'wever, none of his successors

/

Carranza, Obregon, Calles, or later Presidents were at all
representative of the popular vdll.

These men received less

interference from the United States because by then Washington
~

had profitted by Wilson's mistake and it could be seen that
absolutism YlaS the only practical means of government in
Mexico.
1 Fred Rippy, JoseVasconcelos, and Guy Stevens, Mexico,

University of Chicago Press, 1928, 126.
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It is possible that Huerta might have accomplished a
great many beneficial reforms in Mexico.
opportunity to do so.
treasury.

BIt he was given no

He stepped into power with an empty

His hands were tied by the failure of the United
,

.

States to recognize him and by the,1oe"tfects of non-recognition.
These were lack of foreign func1s and encouragement of oppositional political groups.

Had Huerta,.obtained recognition he

might have obtained funds.

Had he obtained funds he might

have been able to crush the insurgent forces and maintained
peace.
strife.

As

it

ViaS,

Huerta's fall was follovled by years of civil

Chief Justice Hughes of the Supreme Court said, !lBy

destroying the Government of Huerta, 'INe left Mexico a prey to
the horrors of revolution. ,,2
The period preceding Carranza's recognition was one of
bloody turmoil.

The expeditions of Villa proved Carranza did

,'"

not possess complete control of Mexico after his recognition.
In this respect he vras no improvement on Huerta.

Huerta's

removal was not, as President Vlilson thought, the ans'wer to
the pro blem of civil strife in Mexico.

Instead it seemed to

igni te a cpnflagration vrhich raged for many years.
DovID to 1920, the country vias
little more than a revolutionary

2 Quoted in Red Mexico by Francis McCullagh, Brentanots Ltd.,
London, 192"8'; 56.
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shambles ••• Even after that date,
civil war 'Was always a possibility,
being avoided more often from strong
handed exercise of power than from
any unwillingness of opI?osition
groups to engage in it.)

.,'

President Theodore Roosevelt, shortly,. 4,,before he died, wrote:
Mexico is our Balkan Peninsula,
and during the last five years,
thanks largely to Mr. Wilson'~ able
assistance, it has been reduced to
a condition as hideous ~s that of
the Balkan Peninsula under Turkish
rule.4
Wilson's Mexican policy solved no Mexican problems.
Nor did Wilson's policy bring democracy to the Mexican
people.

Huerta had not taken deraocracy from the Mexican people

for they never possessed it.

Nor did Carranza and his

successors bring democracy to Mexico.
acquire suffrage.

The people did not

Elections did not change in form.

In 1928,

Francis McCUllagh wrote, "Democratic Govern.'IJlent does not

01',,-.

course exist; votes cast at Presidential elections are not
counted.,,5

Nor did the people acquire prosperity, there was

too much warfare going on.
people

The material condition of the

did not change in the years follovang Huerta's

expulsion.

~

The policy of the United States in Ivlexico inspired

3 Charles Ed'ward Chapman, ReJ?ublican Hispanic .America,
Macmillan, New York, 1937, 234.
4 Quoted in Red Mexico by McCullagh, 55.
5 Ibid., 61.-

I'
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suspicion on the part of. the Latin American nations.
itself showed no gratitude to the United states.

Mexico

During the

first Tlorld War, Mexico proposed to the Latin American
Republics that they prohi bi t the shipment of munitions to
belligerent European nations.

•

.

,9 4;

TIns waS not in conformity

v.d. th the interests of the United states.
Wilson t s policy in Mexico gave,

t~e

rest of the 'world an

idea of what to expect in regard to his foreign policy.

Henry

Stoddard VTri tes:
The response from l..Iexico in

1914 to our demand to salute our

flag VlaS a pattern later for the
response of both England and
Germany to our notes of protest.
Mexico never saluted, England
continued to search our ships and
Genl1any submarined more ruthlessly
than ever. Tovrard all three
countries vre adopted a policy of
'watchful vrai tingt for something
that never came--end that everybody gut 1\lilson ImeVl vlOuld never
come.
In spite of Wilson t s frequent avoyrals of noninterference he did not allo'\'! Mexico to Y,1Ork out i ts political '
proble.rns in its oVJn vmy.

Dy his meddling he did not contri-

~

bute anything to the vTelfare of l.lexico or its people.

Rather

he added to the discontent and confusion already existing in
Mexico.

6 Stoddard, 490.
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Woodro"v'! TJilson t s policy

1NaS

no doubt sincere but 118.sed

on emotions rather than }:novJ'ledge.

He vranted to reform. Mexico

but failed to realize that reform must come from \'.d. thin a
country not from an outside force.
idealistic theories.
OV!l1

Wilson was governed by
.• 147

That his ideals were in advance of his

countrymen "'!as proved by their attitude tovmrd the Leae;ue

of Nations.

Hov! could a country like Jlexico be e::1.--:pected to

appreciate them?
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